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Abstract
Two cornerstones of empirical and policy analysis of firms in industrial organization, macro
and labor are the determinants of the firm size distribution, and the determinants of sorting between
workers and firms. We propose a unifying theory of production where management resolves a tradeo↵
between hiring more versus better workers. The span of control or size is therefore intimately
intertwined with the sorting pattern. We provide a condition for sorting that captures this tradeo↵
between the quantity and quality of workers and that generalizes Becker’s sorting condition. A
system of di↵erential equations determines the equilibrium allocation, the firm size and wages, and
allows us to characterize the allocation of the quality and quantity of labor to firms of di↵erent
productivity. We show that our model nests a large number of widely used existing models. We also
augment the model to incorporate labor market frictions in the presence of sorting with large firms.
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1 Introduction
Two cornerstones of empirical and policy analysis of firms in industrial organization, macro and labor,
are the determinants of the firm size distribution, and the determinants of sorting between workers and
firms. Firm size reflects an important aspect of a firm’s productivity. Firms that own or invent more
productive technologies tend to exploit those advantages by producing and selling more. To that end,
they also hire more workers. At the same time, the skill composition of a firm’s workforce is crucial for
output. Firms’ competition for skilled workers leads to sorting of workers of di↵erent skills into jobs
of di↵erent productivity. The literature has treated these two determinants – firm size and sorting –
largely independently.1 What’s missing is a tractable framework that allows for the standard firm size
choice but also allows thought about sorting heterogeneous workers into such large firms. In this paper
we take a first step towards proposing such a framework that connects the two and ask what the key
forces are that determine sorting when firm size matters, and what the key forces are that determine
the size distribution when sorting matters.
We introduce a model of the firm where the span of control – the number of workers under the
control of management within that firm – attributes an essential role to the firm. Just like in the
canonical macroeconomic context, firms in our model predominantly make quantity decisions. Endowed
with di↵erent management, technologies or capital, companies choose the span of control accordingly,
which has important implications for the size of firms (Lucas (1978); Jovanovic (1982); Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993)). This labor factor intensity decision is both realistic and a convenient modeling
device. Yet, firms typically face a more complex tradeo↵. They simultaneously choose the quality
of the workers as well as the quantity. A retail arm of a company that sells electronics products for
example faces the tradeo↵ between hiring skilled shop floor assistants who have extensive experience
with a wide range of its products versus more unskilled assistants who can only be of help with the
most basic features. Heterogeneity in skills and jobs is without doubt an important component of the
labor market. Without the quantity dimension, the allocation process of di↵erently skilled workers to
jobs has extensively been analyzed, both with search frictions and without. In the standard frictionless
matching model (Becker (1973)), each firm consists of exactly one job which leads to sorting since the
firm’s choice is in e↵ect about which worker to hire, the extensive margin, rather than how many, the
intensive margin.
By simultaneously solving the quantity and the quality dimension within the same model, we not
only nest other well known models of sorting and of firm size. Most importantly, we also analyze how
the di↵erent technological determinants interact in general equilibrium with endogenous prices. Within
1The literature has proposed tractable models of sorting in settings with many-to-one matching, for example Sattinger
(1993), or Garicano (2000). These models have provided useful insights, deriving their tractability from the fact that the
number of workers (i.e., the firm size) is fully determined once the manager has chosen the type of his workforce. Our
framework instead endogenizes the size decision, which is standard in most macroeconomic environments (see for example
Lucas (1978)). We discuss in Section 4 how existing models solve as special cases in our general framework, as well as the
relation of our setup to the broader literature on many-to-one matching.
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this framework, we pin down the features of the equilibrium allocation: the sorting pattern, the firm
size distribution and the wage distribution. We find a surprisingly simple condition for assortative
matching that captures both the quality and quantity considerations. This condition is new and com-
pares the di↵erent degrees of complementarity2 along four margins: (1) type complementarity captures
the interaction between firm and worker types. Clearly, if better firms receive an exceptionally high
return only from better workers, then they will end up hiring those workers. This is the only e↵ect
present in standard quality-sorting models in the spirit of Becker (1973). Additionally, there is the (2)
complementarity in quantities of workers and resources, just as in standard models with homogeneous
labor and resources (or capital). There is the (3) span of control complementarity between the firm or
manager type and the number of workers that features in Lucas (1978): how much of a higher marginal
product do better managers have from supervising more workers of a given skill? Finally, there is the
(4) managerial resource complementarity ; the complementarity between worker skills and managerial
or firm resources: do better workers have a higher marginal product when receiving more supervision
time? A simple tradeo↵ between these four forces determines the pattern of sorting, characterizing the
e cient equilibrium outcome and measuring of the e ciency losses that would result from misallocation.
We also precisely pin down the composition of the workforce across di↵erent firm types, i.e., how
firms resolve the tradeo↵ between span of control over more workers versus the quality workers. A
system of three di↵erential equations governs the equilibrium allocation of types and quantities entirely.
In particular, this gives a prediction for the firm’s span of control, and therefore, for the firm size
distribution and also determines the equilibrium allocation of skills and the wage distribution. This
system also makes explicit how firm size interacts with the skill premium, providing a simple mapping
between assortative matching and the size distribution of firms. Our conditions tell us when there is
Positive Assortative Matching (PAM), when worker types are increasing or decreasing in firm size, and
when there is Negative Assortative Matching (NAM), and again, when worker types are increasing or
decreasing in firm size.
The combination of size and quality sorting allows us to study how changes in the size distribution
a↵ect wage inequality and the skill premium. We can also investigate how changes in the inequality
of inputs a↵ects the firm size distribution. Obviously, neither of these questions can be answered in
models where all inputs are homogeneous or where all firms have equal size, as in most of the previous
literature.
The major appeal of our model is that it nests a large number of well-established models in the
literature. Section 4 is devoted to how the relevant literature relates to the mathematics of our model.
We have chosen to give detailed credit to the related literature only after we introduce our model,
allowing us to combine the discussion of related papers with some simple analytical arguments about
2We will use the term complementarity and supermodularity interchangeably. For our purposes, it can best be thought
of as the fact that the marginal contribution of higher input (quantity or quality) to output is higher when matched with
other high inputs, i.e. there are synergies. In mathematical terms, the cross-partial of the output generated is positive
(negative in the case of substitutes or submodularity).
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how these can be represented within our framework. Most notably, we show that Becker’s one-to-one
matching model is the limit case of a multiplicatively separable version of ours wherein the quantities
enter as a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technology that converges to Leontief, i.e., with
an elasticity of substitution equal to zero. We show similar connections to influential papers Witten by
Sattinger (1975) and Garicano (2000) who embed specific forms in which firm size depends on worker
and firm types but do not allow this to be a choice variable. We also discuss other related work from
various literatures, such as the misallocation debate.
Theoretically, the main contribution of our results is to solve and characterize a model of sorting with
many-to-one matches. Moreover, our theory is cast in a framework that is amenable to its application
in standard macro, labor and industrial organization models. Testament to the generality this simple
model nests a large number of well-known models currently used, yet, we obtain the general formulation
while retaining assumptions that render the model tractable and allow for clear insights on sorting and
firm size. Conceptually this is novel; we are not aware of anyone having analyzed it. The many-
to-one matching model has long been known in the social choice literature, but has typically been
analyzed exclusively to show existence in a small economy with finite agents (in particular Kelso and
Crawford (1982) and their celebrated gross-substitutes condition). The characterization of the solution
of our proposed model o↵ers a set of conditions hitherto unknown. Technically, the derivation of the
necessary condition for equilibrium aligns with existing models. What is much more challenging is the
su ciency of the condition. In the standard one-to-one matching model, this is easily satisfied. In this
many-to-one matching model with endogenous size, our local sorting condition does not easily integrate
to a global condition, which makes the problem substantially more complex.
We also discuss our model in the context of applications to topics of economic relevance, such
as mismatch of inputs of production, the skill premium, and economic geography. Existing theories
currently discuss heterogeneous inputs only in passing and rely on homogeneity in their formal modeling.
We illustrate how heterogeneity can be incorporated and illustrate its importance. Building on the
mismatch model of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014), we illustrate the role of skill heterogeneity
in quantifying the misallocation of resources. And we show how the seminal framework to study the
evolution of the skill premium of Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000) can be extended to
allow for heterogeneity even within the high and the low skill sector.
Our theory is also amenable to quantitative analysis. In an earlier version of this paper, we quantita-
tively assessed the theory to analyze the evolution of technology along two dimensions: we parametrized
the model to capture “traditional” Skill Biased Technological Change, as well as Quantity Biased Tech-
nological Change that allows firms to adjust their size. Using matched employer-employee data from
Germany we found that technological change along the second dimension has been important over the
last two decades in driving the size distribution. It has also been a mitigating force that limits the
impact of skill-biased technological change on wage inequality. These exercises highlight the important
equilibrium interplay of sorting and firm size.
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Finally, we show how our framework lends itself to introducing search frictions. To our knowledge,
this extension with search frictions provides the first model that combines three essential features
of labor market data: two-sided heterogeneity with complementarities, unemployment due to search
frictions, and large firms. Existing models have combined two of those three, but not all three at the
same time. Most surprisingly, we find that in this model the condition for assortative matching is
independent of the matching technology and thus holds even if we move away from a Walrasian setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the model. In Section 3 we first
solve the model and derive the general sorting condition, and then we characterize the equilibrium
assignment, the firm size distribution and the wage profile. We discuss in Section 4 the special cases
that are nested in the model, we review the related literature, and we present extensions that outline
how the model might be used in applied settings. In Section 5 we analyze search frictions in the context
of sorting with large firms. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a static assignment problem in the tradition of Monge-Kantorovich, except that the allo-
cation is not limited to one-to-one matching. To preview the basic economic situation that the model
intends to capture, we consider an economy with two sides, which we mostly label as firms and workers,
even though the labels managers/workers, farms/land, and capital/labor would be equally appropriate.
Heterogeneity exists on both sides: workers di↵er by skills, and firms are heterogeneous in terms of
the quality of some proprietary resource that is exclusive to the firm, such as scarce managerial talent
or particular proprietary capital goods. These scarce internal resources limit the scope of the firm.
In a modern business setting, the resource might reflect the time endowment of an entrepreneur who
spends time interacting with and supervising her employees, and quality can refer to the value of the
final output or the ability during such supervision. If she supervises di↵erent workers, she might adjust
supervision time to suit each worker’s skill. Output depends on the type of worker and of the supervisor
and the time they interact. The setup is formalized as follows.
Agents. The economy consists of firms and workers. Workers are indexed by their skill x 2 X = R+,
and Hw(x) denotes the measure of workers with skills below x. Firms are indexed by their productivity
type y 2 Y = R+, where Hf (y) denotes the measure of firms with type below y. Unless otherwise
stated, we focus on distributions Hf and Hw with non-zero continuous densities hf and hw on the
compact subsets [x, x] ⇢ X and [y, y] ⇢ Y, respectively, but especially for our main characterization
result we also provide a proof for arbitrary distribution functions. In line with the matching literature,
we assume that x and y are observable and focus our interest on the equilibrium allocation problem
in the presence of complete information. The incomplete information problem remains of interest and
importance, but it is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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Preferences and Production. A firm of type y that hires l workers of identical type x produces
output according to non-negative function f(x, y, l), which is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
l. This nests heterogeneous y firms that make intensive margin choices about firm size l familiar from
Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982), and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), and heterogeneous y firms that
make extensive margin choices about worker type x familiar from Becker (1973), enabling us to study
their interaction. For the casual reader, without substantial loss of insight, this can serve as a primitive
for the subsequent analysis. Nevertheless, we proceed by providing a more micro-founded production
structure that in principle allows for multiple worker types within the same firm. This allows us to
closely link our study to existing work on worker supervision, to highlight the underlying assumptions
that give rise to a uniform workforce in equilibrium, and to eventually represent our results in an even
more concise way.
The main primitive of our model is the output function F : R4+! R++ that describes how the
firm combines labor and its resources to produce output. To impose discipline on the problem and as
is standard in the literature, we assume the technology is common to all firms. What di↵ers are the
inputs. We can thus interpret the firm productivity (or TFP) as y. Output is perfectly transferable, and
firms maximize profits while workers maximize wage income. A firm has a fixed amount of proprietary
resources. If a firm of type y hires an amount of labor l of type x, it must choose a fraction of its
resources r that it dedicates to this worker type. This allows the firm y to produce output
F (x, y, l, r) (1)
with this worker type x, where the first two arguments (x, y) are quality variables describing the worker
and firm types while the latter two arguments (l, r) are quantity variables describing the level of inputs.
We assume that output is twice di↵erentiable, but place no further restrictions on the quantity variables,
even though we often refer to higher types as “better” types which is more appropriate for output
functions that are increasing in types. Our main assumptions on the production functions concern the
quantity variables. For technical reasons we assume that F is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
each quantity variable in the interior of the type space, no output is produced without resources, and
standard Inada conditions apply.3
Of economic relevance is the assumption that production displays constant returns to scale in the
quantity variables. For example, if the output of each worker depends only on his own type x, the type
of the firm y, and how many resources the worker receives, then constant returns to scale arise as twice
the workers produce twice the output if the resources per worker stay constant. Constant returns imply
that the output in (1) can be expressed as the product of the amount of resource r and the output per
3The requirement that F (x, y, l, 0) = 0 is made for convenience as it rules out that workers are hired by firms that
devote no resources to them. This is only weakly concave in l, and therefore we can only assume strict concavity in the
interior. Finally, Inada conditions on labor are liml!0 Fl(x, y, l, r) =1 for given x, y, r > 0, and liml!1 Fl(x, y, l, r) = 0.
Similar conditions can be placed on resources.
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unit of resource:4
f(x, y, ✓) := F (x, y, ✓, 1) (2)
where ✓ = l/r represents the amount of workers per unit of resource, which we call the intensity. In line
with the interpretation in Lucas (1978), we interpret the intensity or span of control of the manager as
the size of the firm, as if we were explicitly talking about the span of control of the CEO. Therefore,
in what follows, we use intensity ✓ and firm size interchangeably. As mentioned earlier, the function
f(x, y, ✓) represents the production of a firm that only hires one type of worker, in which case it trivially
spends all its resources on this type (r = 1). Moreover, when r > 1 output F (x, y, l, r) = rf(x, y, l/r)
can be viewed as the optimal output of r firms of type y that optimally employ l workers of type y.
Because of the tight link between f and F in (2), either can be used as the primitive of the model.
One can interpret the resources r as the time available to the manager. This interpretation follows
the notion of span of control in Lucas (1978) and further developed in the literature on knowledge
hierarchies (Garicano (2000)). Resources are thus not the equivalent of capital that can be bought on
the market. The managerial resources are fixed, and the only choice for management is how to assign
those time resources to di↵erent skill levels x.5 We do make clear the distinction between resources r
and other generic capital that can be purchased on the market in section 4. There we also discuss an
endogenous choice of resources.
The action of a firm y is to choose two distributions, the number of workers of each type and the
amount of resources devoted to them. Let labor demand Ly(x) denote the cumulative distribution
of the number of workers that firm y hires of type x or lower, and let resource allocation Ry(x)
denote the cumulative distribution of the resources that the firm dedicates to all workers of type x
or lower. There is no loss to the assumption that firms hire workers only if they devote resources
to them, as workers without resources produce no output (formally this means that labor demand is
absolutely continuous in the resource allocation). The choices of Ly(x) and Ry(x) then determine the
number of workers per unit of resources ✓y(x) relevant in (2) through the Radon-Nikodym derivative
✓y(x) := dLy(x)/dRy(x) almost everywhere. Conversely, the number of workers per resource ✓y(x)
and the allocation of resources Ry(x) fully summarize the firm’s labor demand as the sum of workers-
per-resource ✓y(x) over all resources: Ly(x) = R xx ✓(x˜)dRy(x˜).6 We can therefore interchangeably use
(Ly(·),Ry(·)) and (✓y(·),Ry(·)) to represent the firm’s choices.
4If total output F (x, y, l, r) has constant returns to scale, we can write it as F (x, y, l, r) = rF (x, y, l/r, 1) = rf(x, y, ✓).
5Because of constant returns to scale (CRS) in quantity variables, an alternative interpretation of the model is one
where anyone can combine l units of workers x with r units of managers y to provide output F (x, y, l, r), and workers get
paid the equilibrium wage and managers their equilibrium salaries. The operator of F obtains no profits in equilibrium
because of CRS and free entry, and all returns go to the scarce resources of worker and managerial time. Our setup can
then be interpreted as each manager operating her own firm, in which case the firm profits coincide with the return to
management time. While we fixed the time endowment per manager at unity, this could be chosen endogenously. Our
sorting conditions would not change as they rely on aggregate amounts of resources in equilibrium, but the discussion of
firm size would have to be rescaled by the endogenous choice of resources that each manager acquires.
6Since ✓y(x) = dLy(x)/dRy(x), one can use ✓y(x) to reconstruct labor demand as: Ly(x) = R
(x,✓):xx˜
✓(x˜)dRy(x˜).
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When a firm hires workers of multiple types we assume that its total output is the sum of the outputs
across all its types. Additive separability again arises naturally if the output of each worker depends
only on his and the firm’s types and on the amount of resources available to him. Such formulations
allow for interactions between firm and worker type, but abstracts from interactions amongst workers
except through the limited resources. This abstraction is restrictive, but implies existence and – more
importantly – tractability for the analysis of all the other cross-complementarities between quantities
and qualities. Since F (x, y, l, r) = rf(x, y, ✓) is the output of one worker type, the sum across all
worker types can formally be represented as
R
f(x, y, ✓y(x))dRy(x) where, as mentioned above, dRy(x)
represents how the firm allocates resources across di↵erent worker types.
Competitive Market Equilibrium. We consider a competitive equilibrium where firms can hire a
worker of type x at wage w(x). In equilibrium, firms’ hiring decisions must be optimal and markets for
each worker type must clear.7
Profit maximization of a firm of type y entails a choice of a production plan that maximizes output
minus wage costs. For resources devoted to workers of type x at intensity ✓, the output is f(x, y, ✓) but
the firm must pay the wage w(x) to each of the ✓ workers that produce with this resource. The optimal
production strategy therefore solves:
max
✓y ,Ry
Z
[f(x, y, ✓y(x))  w(x)✓y(x)]dRy(x). (3)
The firm’s total wage bill
R
w(x)✓dRy consists of the wage w(x) integrated over the density of its labor
demand Ly(x) = R xx ✓(x˜)dRy(x˜). For later reference it is useful to note that a firm that only hires one
worker type x has a workforce size of l(y) = ✓y(x).
Feasibility of the total allocation of resources requires that firms attempt to hire no more workers
than there are in the population. Consider any interval of worker types (x0, x]. A firm of type y has a
demand for such workers of Ly(x)  Ly(x0). Integrated over all firms this yields the aggregate demand
for such worker types. Therefore, labor demand schedules L = {Ly}y2Y are feasible if the implied
aggregate demand does not exceed the economy’s endowment with such worker types, for all x0, x:Z
y
⇥Ly(x)  Ly(x0)⇤ dHf  Hw(x) Hw(x0). (4)
We can now define an equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a tuple functions (w, ✓y,Ry,Ly) consisting of a non-negative wage
schedule w(x) as well as intensity functions ✓y(x) and resource allocations Ry(x) with associated feasible
labor demands Ly(x) such that
7We require wages to be non-negative in order not to violate the workers’ outside option, which is normalized to zero
for all agents. Firms can achieve their outside option simply by hiring no workers. We will call worker types with a zero
wage and firm types with zero profits as inactive, while all other agents are called active.
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1. Optimality: For any y the combination (✓y,Ry) solves (3).
2. Market Clearing: (4) holds with equality if wages are strictly positive a.e. on (x0, x].
The market clearing condition simply states that if wages for some worker types are positive, their
markets clear. A useful feature of our setup is that firm’s preferences over workers are convex, as
shown in the appendix, so that we can draw on classical results on existence and welfare theorems, e.g.,
Ostroy (1984) and Khan and Yannelis (1991). Our main focus here is on characterization: When do
better firms hire better workers? How are the wages determined? When do better firms employ more
employees? How is that e↵ected by quantity-biased technological change?
Assortative Matching. Our focus is on labor demands that are monotonic in x and y. There is
Positive Assortative Matching if higher firm types employ higher worker types in their production,
i.e., for almost all firm types y and y0 with y > y0 it holds that x is in the support of Ly and x0 is
in the support of Ly0 only if x   x0. Negative Assortative Matching can be defined by reversing the
last inequality, capturing that lower type workers are employed in higher type firms. This definition is
suitable in the presence of mass points in the type distributions.
A more natural and more tractable formulation of assortative matching arises if higher types produce
strictly more output and the type distributions have non-zero continuous densities. We will focus on
this case for expositional convenience, but our main sorting result in Proposition 1 holds without these
restrictions. With these restrictions higher types are more valuable and therefore there exist boundary
types xˆ and yˆ such that all higher types are active. Assume that almost all active firm types y hire
exactly one worker type ⌫(y) and reach size l(y). We prove in the Appendix (Lemma 3) that this
must hold if there is assortative matching. An equivalent but simpler notion of assortative matching is
therefore that ⌫(y) exists and is strictly monotone for almost all active types.
Traditionally models are solved from the perspective of the workers, for which the above discussions
imply that for almost all active types x we can define the inverse µ = ⌫ 1 so that we can interpret µ(x)
as the firm type that hires worker type x. The intensity for this worker is the worker intensity ✓(x) :=
✓µ(x)(x). Clearly µ inherits the strict monotonicity of ⌫, and as mentioned earlier, intensity equals firm
size so that ✓(x) = l(µ(x)). The market clearing condition now becomes particularly tractable. For the
case of PAM, for example, it reduces toZ y
µ(x)
✓(s)hf (s)ds =
Z x
x
hw(s)ds (5)
where the right hand side sums up all workers above x and the left hand side sums up all firms that
hire these workers times the number of workers each hires. In the case of one-to-one matching as in
Becker, ✓ = 1 and therefore
R x
x h
w(s)ds =
R y
µ(x) h
f (s)ds implies Hw(x) = Hf (µ(x)). With variable firm
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size ✓(x), this now means that we are matching one firm to ✓(x) workers.8
3 The Main Results
Models of assortative matching are in general di cult to characterize completely. Therefore, the lit-
erature has tried to identify conditions under which sorting is assortative. These conditions help our
understanding of the underlying driving sources of sorting. And if the appropriate conditions are
fulfilled, they substantially reduce the complexity of the assignment problem and allow further char-
acterization of the equilibrium. In this section we first derive necessary and su cient conditions for
assortative matching, and then we characterize the assortative equilibrium allocation. The objective
is double. We aim to obtain conditions on assortative matching and whether larger firms tend to hire
more productive workers. This will give us a simple taxonomy when there is PAM and worker types
are increasing or decreasing in firm size, and when there is NAM and again worker types are increasing
or decreasing in firm size. We summarize our results in Table 1. Our second objective is to provide a
system of di↵erential equations that solves for the equilibrium allocation µ, the firm size distribution ✓
and the wage schedule w.
3.1 Assortative Matching
Our main result on sorting provides a necessary and su cient condition that applies to arbitrary type
distributions, and places no restrictions on how types influence output. To build up intuition, we focus
on necessary conditions for assortative matching in the case discussed at the end of the previous section:
higher types produce more output and distributions have non-zero continuous densities. As outlined
earlier, in an assortative equilibrium we can define for almost all active worker types the function µ(x)
that denotes the firm type that hires worker x. Employment is at intensity ✓(x) = ✓µ(x)(x) > 0 at the
equilibrium wage w(x) > 0. The strict inequalities arise because otherwise either worker or firm payo↵
would be zero, which would violate that these types are active. In an equilibrium with positive sorting
µ(x) is strictly increasing. When output is increasing in x, w(x) is increasing as better types necessarily
earn higher wages. Monotone functions are di↵erentiable almost everywhere. Therefore, for almost any
active x there exists an open neighborhood in which the following arguments based on di↵erentiability
are valid.
For this to be an equilibrium outcome, the firms’ choices must maximize their optimization prob-
lem (3). The next Lemma – which also holds for arbitrary distributions and production functions –
establishes that we can focus on a simplified problem.
8Like in our model, the mechanical relation that pins down matching in Becker (1973) no longer holds even in the
one-to-one matching model when types are multi dimensional. See Lindenlaub (2016) and Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2011).
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Lemma 1 Consider an active firm with strategy (✓y,Ry) that maximizes (3). Almost everywhere in
the support of Ry it has to hold that (x, ✓y(x)) solves
max
x˜,✓˜
f(x˜, y, ✓˜)  ✓˜w(x˜). (6)
Proof. In Appendix.
This Lemma states that firms do not choose worker type and intensity unless the combination
maximizes the return per unit of resource, which implies that firms with a unique optimizer for (6)
hire only one worker type, and therefore endogenously brings our setup in line with one that assumes a
uniform workforce from the start. To be clear, this is a result and not a restriction that we impose. The
main reason why firms pick only one and not multiple worker types x is because output is additively
separable across di↵erent x. Therefore, given wages w(x), if a firm generates the highest possible profits
from matching with type x, then it would do worse from also hiring worker types x0 6= x. Of course,
this di↵erentiation results because we lack any direct complementarity between worker types.
Given we can focus on the optimization problem (6) with firms choosing only one type x to match
with, our solution now must find which x and how many of those, ✓. Our objective is to establish positive
or negative sorting, where the allocation µ(x) is single valued, but for now there is no restriction on µ.
Optimality requires that the choices solve the first order conditions with respect to x and ✓ :
f✓(x, µ(x), ✓(x))  w(x) = 0, (7)
fx(x, µ (x) , ✓(x))  ✓(x)w0(x) = 0, (8)
where functions with lower case letters denote partial derivatives (e.g., fx = @f/@x). Note that these
equalities hold within the neighborhood around x. The implicit function theorem applied to (7) estab-
lishes that ✓(x) is locally di↵erentiable, and then the implicit function theorem applied to (8) implies
that w0(x) is once more locally di↵erentiable. A necessary condition for optimality of the first order
conditions is that the Hessian is positive definite, and in particular that its determinant is positive:
f✓✓
⇥
fxx   ✓w00(x)
⇤  ⇥fx✓   w0(x)⇤2   0, (9)
where the argument (x, µ(x), ✓(x)) of f and its derivatives is suppressed for notational convenience.
While this still entails the endogenous wage schedule, one can di↵erentiate the first order conditions
along the equilibrium path and use this to substitute out the wage schedule to obtain equivalently (see
appendix for the derivation):
µ0(x)
24fxy   fy✓
⇣
fx✓   fx✓
⌘
f✓✓
35   0. (10)
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Since PAM requires µ0(x) > 0, a necessary condition is that the square bracket is weakly positive. This
places restrictions on the production technology f of firms with only one worker type. The term fxy is
familiar from one-to-one matching models and – if positive – captures that higher firm types value higher
worker types more. This is not enough to ensure PAM. It also matters to which extent higher types
value the size of the firm. Intuitively, if higher type firms obtain higher value from being being large
but higher worker types are more productive in small firms, then this counteracts the familiar force.
This can be seen even more easily when using (2) to express this in terms of the original production
function F. The next proposition makes this point, states this as a necessary and su cient condition,
dispenses with assumptions on the type distribution, and does not require output to increase in types:
Proposition 1 A necessary condition to have equilibria with positive assortative matching under any
arbitrary distribution of types is that the following inequality holds:
Fxy   FylFxr
Flr
(11)
for all (x, y, l, r) 2 R4++. With a strict inequality, it is also su cient to ensure that any equilibrium en-
tails positive assortative matching. The opposite inequality provides a necessary and su cient condition
for negative assortative matching.
Proof. In Appendix.
The proof has to deal with possible mass points in the type distributions which can lead to multiple
firm types choosing a given worker type in equilibrium. More importantly, the argument above only
shows that the derivative of the matching function µ(x) has to be positive when equation (11) holds
wherever this derivative is defined. In a positive assortative equilibrium this derivative is defined almost
everywhere and equation (11) is necessary at these points. To ensure this under all type distributions, we
show in the Appendix that equation (11) is necessary everywhere. Equation (11) does not immediately
guarantee su ciency since it does not rule out that the matching can have a discontinuity with a
discrete jump downward, which requires a global rather than a local argument. In the Appendix we
deal with these issues by exploiting the implication of the First Welfare Theorem that any equilibrium
allocation maximizes output in this economy with quasi-linear utility. If (11) fails but allocations have
mass around points that are positive assortative, there are strict e ciency gains from re-arranging
production in a negative assortative way. If (11) holds strictly but mass is placed around negative
sorting, e ciency can be improved by re-arranging production in a positive assortative way. These
properties are easy to show in one-to-one matching models where production always requires r = l = 1
and the local PAM requirement of Fxy > 0 can be integrated from xl to xr and from yl to yr to yield the
global implication that F (xh, yh, 1, 1) + F (xl, yl, 1, 1) > F (xh, yl, 1, 1) + F (xl, yh, 1, 1) for any xh > xl
and yh > yl, meaning that output increases when types are matched positively assorted. When the
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quantity dimension is active and r can di↵er from l, the new sorting condition (11) is more involved and
cannot simply be integrated, requiring a substantially more involved argument despite the similarity in
spirit.
As in the standard Becker (1973) model with one-to-one matching, equation (11) in Proposition 1
is a functional equation, and the inequality may not be satisfied everywhere on the support of F . That
may still lead to PAM (or NAM) for a given distribution, but for an arbitrary distribution there will not
always be a monotonic sorting pattern. The conditions we derive below apply when the sorting pattern
is monotone, and as such, the characterization that we obtain below in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1
is complete only under monotonicity.
Interpretation: Condition (11) embodies the quantity-quality trade-o↵ that the firm makes, and
this is captured by all four possible combinations of pairwise complementarities: one within qualities,
two across quality-quantity dimensions, and one within quantities. Observe that, as in the one-to-
one matching model (Becker (1973)), both positive and negative assorted allocations constitute an
equilibrium if the condition holds with equality. Hence, the condition is only su cient when it holds
strictly.
On the left-hand side, a large value of the cross-partial derivative on the quality dimensions (Fxy)
captures strong type complementarity and means that higher firm types have, ceteris paribus, a higher
marginal return for matching with higher worker types. The two terms in the numerator on the right-
hand side represent the complementary interaction across qualities and quantities. The cross-partial
Fyl captures the span of control complementarity. If it is large, it means that higher firm types have a
higher marginal valuation for the quantity of workers. That is, better firms value the number of “bodies”
that work for them especially high. In this case better firms would like to employ many workers. The
managerial resource complementarity Fxr expresses how the marginal product of managerial time varies
across better workers. If managerial time is particularly productive when spent with high skilled types,
then it is positive and large. This would be the case, for example, if learning by high types is faster.9
Notably, if better firms particularly value a large size but better workers who particularly excel with
plentiful resources (implying few co-workers and, therefore, smaller firms) this creates a tension that
counteracts positive assortative matching.
The term in the denominator captures the complementarity in quantities, and acts mostly as a nor-
malization since only its magnitude varies but its sign is always strictly positive due to constant returns
to scale in quantities. Since this term is tightly linked to the concavity in labor holding resources fixed,
9This type of complementarity is often discussed in the context of teaching in the classroom. If a low-ability student
reaches his limits earlier than a high-ability student, then additional instructor time might be more worth-while when it
is devoted to the high-ability student (Fxr > 0). If high-ability students do well without further input while low-ability
students crucially need the instructors time, then additional time by the instructor might be more worthwhile with the
low-ability students (Fxr < 0). Clearly, in this context the output measure is not as clear as in a production setting, and
considerations of fairness and equity play an additional role.
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it captures the extent to which additional labor decreases the value of output.10 The overall condition
(11) can interpreted like the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition, adjusted for the additional com-
plication that there are three goods that firms care about: the number of workers, the type of worker,
and the numeraire.11
The condition for positive assortative matching then compares the within-complementarities with
the across-complementarities. In the absence of a quantity dimension (e.g., as in Becker (1973)) the
right-hand side of the inequality is zero. With a quantity dimension, the requirements for positive
assortative matching now depend on how much substitutability there is of quality for quantity, i.e., the
ability to substitute additional workers to make up for their lower quality, and which worker types are
most negatively a↵ected when additional workers are added. If size is important and better workers
lose more in productivity when they receive fewer resources, then the traditional type complementarity
Fxy must be strong enough for good firms to still employ these types. Substitutability along the
quantity dimensions are key to this trade-o↵. The discussion in Section 4 reveals that as the elasticity
of substitution on the quantity dimension goes to zero – in the limit there is no substitution and agents
can only be matched into pairs – the right hand side goes to zero.
One may wonder what happens when our homogeneity assumption does not hold and output is not
proportional to the ratio ✓ of the labor force l to the amount of resources r. Conceptually, the problem is
identical to the one we solve here (see the Appendix for the derivation). While the interpretation is much
less transparent, the main sorting condition (47) is still necessary for di↵erential positive assortative
matching under increasing returns to scale, only the steps that require homogeneity do not apply.
Finally, our condition (11) depends on four cross-partials, but given four inputs, there are six
di↵erent possible cross-partials. Why are these four in the condition and why are the other two –
namely Fxl and Fyr – not in the condition? The derivation of the condition exploits the constant
returns assumption of F in l, r, which renders it tractable. However, the constant returns assumption
also links the missing derivatives to those found in the condition. To see this, observe that constant
returns imply we can write F = lFl + rFr from Eulers Theorem for homogeneous functions. Taking
the derivative with respect to x and rearranging, we obtain Fxr =
Fx lFxl
r . Similarly, when taking the
derivative with respect to y, we obtain: Fyl =
Fy rFyr
l . Now condition (11) is equivalent to:
Fxy   (Fy   rFyr)(Fx   lFxl)
lrFlr
(12)
10Due to constant returns to scale Frl(x, y, l, r) =  Fll(x, y, l, r)l/r.
11In a standard Spence-Mirlees analysis, agents care only about two dimensions. For example, think about an alternative
model in which agents of type y maximize f(x, y, ✓) and have a budget set M and feasible (x, ✓)-combinations that only
include those that satisfy ✓w(x) = M. In this case the standard single-crossing condition on f would su ce. Our condition
can be thought of as a three-good extension of the Spence-Mirlees condition, where firms can choose di↵erent budget levels
in terms of the numeraire on top of choosing ✓ and x.
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or any combination of cross-partials, for example:
Fxy   Fyl(Fx   lFxl)
lrFlr
. (13)
While this gives another dimension to interpretation of the mechanism, it should be stressed that
these expressions are identical because we use the identity that follows from the constant returns
assumption.12
3.2 Equilibrium Assignment, Firm Size Distribution and Wage Profile
In contrast to models with pairwise matching where assortativeness immediately implies who matches
with whom (the best with the best, the second best with the second best, and so forth), the matching
pattern is not immediate in this framework as particular firms may hire more or less workers in equilib-
rium. Our main focus is the characterization. For the following we will consider output functions that
are strictly increasing in types and distributions with continuous non-zero densities, which ensures that
all types above some cuto↵ are matched. If output can fall for higher types, holding all other variables
constant, than there might be holes in the matching set, and the following characterization can only be
applied on each connected component. The results hold even if output can fall, as long as it could be
ensured that on the equilibrium path, all agents above some cut-o↵ trade. The next proposition fully
characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If matching is assortative and output is strictly increasing in types, then the factor
intensity (firm size), equilibrium assignment, and wages are determined by the following system of
di↵erential equations evaluated along the equilibrium allocation at almost all types :
PAM: ✓0(x) =
H(x)Fyl   Fxr
Flr
; µ0(x) =
H(x)
✓(x)
; w0(x) =
Fx
✓(x)
, (14)
NAM: ✓0(x) =  H(x)Fyl + Fxr
Flr
; µ0(x) =  H(x)
✓(x)
; w0(x) =
Fx
✓(x)
, (15)
where H(x) = hw(x)/hf (µ(x)).
Proof. In Appendix.
This first order di↵erential equation system in µ and ✓ together with appropriate boundary condi-
tions can be used to compute an equilibrium.13 Proposition 2 is stated from the point of view of workers,
12At face value, condition (11) can be interpreted as the geometric average of the “own cross partials” (i.e. within
quantity and quality) to be at least as large as the geometric average of the “across cross partials” (i.e. across quantity
and quality).
13For PAM, one boundary condition is µ(x¯) = y¯. For a guess of ✓(x¯), an equilibrium allocation must solve the first order
di↵erential equation system in µ and ✓ for all lower worker types. Along the di↵erential equation wages, w(x) and firm
profits ⇡(µ(x)) ⌘ f(x, µ(x), ✓(x)) ✓(x)w(x) have to be positive. The guess for ✓(x¯) must be such that at the lowest active
14
and ✓(x) is the size of the firm in which worker type x is employed. From the firm’s perspective, the
firm size is l (y) = ✓(⌫(y)) where ⌫(y) is the inverse of µ(x). Applying the chain rule then immediately
implies that l0(y) = ✓0(⌫(y))✓(⌫(y))/H(⌫(y)) in the case of PAM and the same but with opposite sign in
the case of NAM. This immediately generates the following corollary on the size of di↵erent firm types:
Corollary 1 If matching is assortative and output is increasing in types, better firms hire more workers
if and only if, along the equilibrium path:
1. H(⌫(y))Fyl > Fxr under PAM,
2. H(⌫(y))Fyl >  Fxr under NAM.
To gain intuition, these results can be interpreted as follows. Consider the case of PAM, and
to simplify the exposition we set H(x) = 1 by assuming uniform type distributions, which can be
interpreted as a normalization.14 First, if better firms have a higher marginal value of hiring many
workers (the span of control complementarity Fyl is large), this gives rise to better firms being large.
Nevertheless, under PAM these firms also hire better workers. If these workers have a higher marginal
value from obtaining many resources of the firm (Fxr large), then the firm will tend to be smaller.
Clearly, if Fxr is negative, meaning that better workers need less resources, this generates an even
stronger force for firm size to increase in y. Under NAM, the first e↵ect is the same, but now better
firms are matched with worse workers. In this case, firms become exceptionally large if better workers
need more resources, meaning that worse workers need less resources.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide us with a description of the economy expressed in four interaction
terms, Fxy, Fxr, Fyl and Flr, which determine the sorting patterns and the size distribution. These
patterns can be used to discuss the determinants that are likely to drive matching in various industries.
For example, the most productive firms in the retail market have invested heavily in information
technologies to monitor cash registers, logistics of stocks, and employee performance. This allows a
single store manager to supervise a large number of employees, which in our model is captured by
a large Fyl term. Since top retailers such as Walmart actually pay low wages and hire low skilled
employees compared to smaller and less profitable mom-and-pop stores, NAM seems to prevail. From
condition (11) we therefore infer that the type complementarity Fxy is not too high relative to the span
of control complementarity Fyl. Since top retailers also operate much larger businesses, by the previous
type xˆ the di↵erential equation stops at one of three possible end-point conditions: xˆ > x and w(xˆ) = 0 as not all worker
types are used in production, xˆ = x and µ(xˆ) > y with ⇡(µ(xˆ)) = 0 as not all firm types are used in production, or xˆ = x
and µ(xˆ) = y.
14Intuitively, we can always call workers and firms by their rank in the type distribution. Start with an economy with
production function F and type distributions Hw and Hf with continuous non-zero densities. Give each worker x a new
name xˆ that corresponds to her rank in the type distribution: xˆ(x) = Hw(x). For firms use similarly yˆ(y) = Hf (y). Now
production is Fˆ (xˆ, yˆ, l, r) = F ((Hw) 1 (xˆ),
 
Hf
  1
(yˆ), l, r), where (Hw) 1 and
 
Hf
  1
are the inverse of Hw, and Hf ,
respectively. Clearly, the new economy with ”names” xˆ and yˆ and production Fˆ generates exactly the same output, but
type distributions are by construction uniform.
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corollary we would infer that their span of control complementarity must be larger than the negative
of the managerial resource complementarity Fxr.
In other industries such as management consulting or in law firms, matching appears positive assor-
tative, since top firms hire top graduates. From this we infer that the type complementarityFxy must
be large. While it seems natural that the best managers benefit more from having many team members
in order to leverage their skills (Fyl > 0), they also benefit from spending time with the very talented
team that they assembled to transfer their knowledge (Fxr > 0). The type complementarity must be
large to outweigh the product FylFxr. Firm size changes according to Fyl   Fxr. The fact that top
consultancy firms do not operate much larger groups than lower level ones indicates that the di↵erence
between these two complementarities is small.
Interestingly, if matching is PAM, the distributions Hw, Hf are uniform, and Fyl = Fxr holds
exactly, then the economy operates as in a one-to-one matching model: the ratio of workers to resources
is constant, the assignment and the wages are as in Becker (1973). The reason is that the improvements
of the firm in taking on more workers are exactly o↵set by the advantages of the workers to obtain more
resources. Since the size distribution does not vary across types, the remuneration also does not stray
from the one that arises if we exogenously imposed a one-to-one matching ratio.
A final observation concerns the role of the type distribution when it is not normalized. An im-
mediate implication of interest of these equilibrium conditions is that the size distribution ✓(y) may
change even if we hold the production function and the distribution of firm type constant. This oc-
curs when the distribution of workers changes. In particular, for some distributions of worker skills
better firms will be smaller, while for other distributions, better firms might be larger. Even if the
technological determinants of firms and their production capabilities are identical in two economies, as
is often assumed in the misallocation debate mentioned in the introduction, the firm size distribution
can vary even without distortions in the economy, once the skill distribution is taken into account. We
will return to this and how the model can be used to analyze some issues within this debate below.
We can summarize our results on assortative matching and the size distribution in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the Theoretical Results
PAM NAM
Worker types increase with Fxy >
FylFxr
Flr
Fxy <
FylFxr
Flr
firm size: ✓0(x) > 0 HFyl > Fxr HFyl <  Fxr
Worker types decrease with Fxy >
FylFxr
Flr
Fxy <
FylFxr
Flr
firm size: ✓0(x) < 0 HFyl < Fxr HFyl >  Fxr
Examples. We now illustrate for a specific technology how the equilibrium allocation changes. The
technology is multiplicatively separable in the qualitative inputs and the quantitative inputs, with the
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quantitative inputs CES and the qualitative inputs Cobb-Douglas.
f(x, y, ✓) =
✓
!Ax
1  A
 A + (1  !A)y
1  A
 A
◆  A
1  A
✓!✓ (16)
In this setting, condition (11) that governs PAM versus NAM is particularly straightforward: there is
PAM if  A < 1 and NAM if  A > 1. We illustrate three cases: 1. variation of !A under PAM; 2.
variation of  A under PAM; and 3. variation of !✓ under NAM.15
Figure 1 illustrates that as the share parameter governing the weight on worker quality in production
decreases (!A goes down), productive firms (high y = µ(x), and under PAM, also higher x) become
larger. The equilibrium allocation µ(x) therefore shifts upwards as the more productive firms use up
more skilled workers. The logic is that as the marginal product of labor decreases, firms substitute
quality for quantity and hire more workers. The general equilibrium e↵ect is that the more productive
firms become larger and the less productive workers become smaller.
Note that at !A = 0.5 the size is constant across firms, ✓0 = 0. There is no particular relevance to a
share parameter of !A = 0.5, except that in this particular specification with a lot of symmetry built
in already (with identical, uniform distributions for x and y and !✓ =
1
2), it renders the technology
fully symmetric: the production function F remains unchanged if the roles of workers and firms are
reversed. Under such symmetry, the tradeo↵ between better and more workers exactly balances and
firm size remains constant for all types. This can straightforwardly (though tediously) be derived. If
!A < 0.5 then the size e↵ect dominates, and the opposite holds for !A > 0.5. By changing any of the
other conditions to break the symmetry, it is nevertheless possible to have firm size increasing in firm
type even if !A > 0.5.
Figure 1: For di↵erent values of !A, PAM Allocation µ(x) and intensity/size ✓. Simulation with both
Hf , Hw uniform on [0, 1], !✓ = 0.5, and  A = 0.9.
15The figures that analyze variation of !A under NAM, variation of  A under NAM and variation of !✓ under PAM are
similar and available in the online appendix.
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Figure 2 depicts the e↵ect on the equilibrium allocation of a decrease in the degree of complemen-
tarity between workers skills x and firm productivity y. As the degree of complementarity increases, i.e.
 A decreases, more productive firms hire more workers. Due to higher complementarity, the demand
for skilled labor has gone up and firms hire more. Of course, given limited supply, size cannot increase
for all firms. Mediated by higher wages, lower productivity firms in equilibrium hire fewer workers and
they are of lower skill x.
Figure 2: For di↵erent values of  A, PAM Allocation µ(x) and intensity/size ✓. Simulation with both
Hf , Hw uniform on [0, 1], !A = 0.3, and !✓ = 0.6.
And as !✓ increases, the penalty for large firm size is reduced and overall labor demand is raised.
In the limit, this eliminates decreasing returns and eventually allocates all labor to the best firms. For
our parameter constellations with PAM this is monotone: any increase in !✓ shifts the allocation in
this direction in the sense that good firms become larger and workers are matched to better firms (the
corresponding figure is omitted to save space).
Figure 3: For di↵erent values of !✓, NAM Allocation µ(x) and intensity/size ✓. Simulation with both
Hf , Hw uniform on [0, 1], !A = 0.5, and  A = 1.1.
When types are substitutes ( A > 1) the allocation is NAM and the e↵ect of increasing !✓ becomes
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more subtle. The size distribution is shaped by market clearing and the fact that under negative sorting
the best firms hire the worst workers. This is evident for a given parameter configuration in Figure 3,
where the allocation and size distribution do not follow a monotone pattern in !✓. As !✓ increases,
more mass is shifted towards high productivity (small) firms, away from low productivity (large) firms.
In the right panel we see more at the top for higher µ firms and less a the bottom as !✓ increases.
For mid-level firms the shift is not necessarily monotone: it depends on how many workers from lower
type firms are shifted up to the middle firms and how many are moved from the middle further up.
Eventually, as !✓ approaches unity, the more productive firms will attract all the workers, and the slope
of the size distribution ✓0(µ) will change from negative to positive.
The next two sections are devoted to showing that the general setup that we studied, our main the-
ory, is flexible enough to encompass a large range of environments. The subsequent section 4 highlights
that our model captures many existing environments as special cases and allows the introduction of
two-sided heterogeneity into many competitive economies that have so far been analyzed without them.
The most elaborate extension that incorporates search frictions is presented in Section 5.
4 Discussion: Special Cases and Relation to the Literature
In this section we discuss the relation to the existing literature, we present simple extensions, and
we highlight the applicability of our framework to economic issues such as mismatch of factor inputs,
the measurement of the skill premium, and economic geography. Wherever possible, we derive existing
models as special cases within our own setup. This documents how our model nests a number of models
that have been extensively used in the literature. It also highlights that our model can capture new
settings that have not been analyzed before. The introduction of search frictions and unemployment
is, because of its theoretical and economic significance, the most substantial application, separately
presented in Section 5.
Efficiency units of labor have been long-standing instruments to incorporate di↵erences in labor
productivity (see, e.g., Stigler (1961)) and are still a prevalent assumption in many models in macro and
labor economics. In such formulations a firm of type y that hires several worker types xi at quantities
li produces output according to some function F˜ (y,
P
xili). That means that workers of a given skill
are exactly replaceable by a number of workers of a di↵erent skill proportional to their skill di↵erence:
workers with half the skill level are perfect substitutes as long as there are twice as many of them. Our
setup captures this case when F (x, y, l, r) = rF˜ (y, xl/r). Clearly, if only one worker type is hired, the
unit amount of internal resources is concentrated on them and we replicate the output F˜ (y, xl). With
multiple workers types xi at quantities li, the firm devotes its resources optimally between them, and it
can be shown that the resulting output is indeed F˜ (y,
P
xili) (see Appendix A.11).16 It can easily be
16A generalized version of this setup is a production function f˜(x¯, y, L) that takes as inputs the average type x¯ =
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verified that in this case our sorting condition is satisfied exactly with equality (FxyFlr = FylFxr), which
captures the well-known fact that sorting is arbitrary: each firm cares only about the total amount of
e ciency units, but not whether they are obtained by few high-type workers or many low-type workers.
One-to-one matchingmodels originating from Kantorovich (1942), Koopmans and Beckmann (1957),
Shapley and Shubik (1972), and Becker (1973), introduced a meaningful interaction between worker
and firm types and have been informative for analyzing interactions in markets with two-sided het-
erogeneity.17 They restrict attention to settings where agents must be matched in pairs, which limits
insights into the size of the firm and its capital intensity.18 Within our setup, one-to-one matching
can be captured with the functional form F (x, y,min{l, r},min{r, l}) = F (x, y, 1, 1)min{l, r} so that
each unit of labor needs exactly one unit of resource to be productive, and vice versa. This Leontief
formulation is only weakly concave, but its well-known sorting condition Fxy > 0 arises in the limit as
our production function approaches this, which is most easily shown in the limit of the following two
special cases.
Multiplicative separability of the form F (x, y, l, r) = A(x, y)B(l, r) provides particular tractabil-
ity, and the one-to-one matching case in the previous section can be viewed as a special case where the
quantity dimension B(l, r) is Leontief. In the multiplicative case the condition (11) for positive assorta-
tive matching is also multiplicatively separable and can be written as [AAxy/(AxAy)][BBlr/(BlBr)]  
1.19
Constant elasticity of substitution in quantities for the multiplicatively separable case arises
if B(l, r)’s elasticity is constant and equal to "; the sorting condition then reduces to AAxy/(AxAy)   ",
or equivalently FFxy/(FxFy)   " as the quantity term B cancels. This allows us to capture two special
cases of particular relevance. The one-to-one matching model discussed earlier arises as the elasticity
of substitution approaches zero, in which case B becomes Leontief and the sorting condition reduces
to the well-known Fxy   0. Another special case is the Cobb-Douglas specification where B = l r1   ,
which arises either by assumption as in Grossman, Helpman, and Kircher (2016) that builds on this
special case of our work, or when output is linear in the amount of workers but is valued in the market
at decreasing returns due to CES preferences of final consumers, as e.g. in Costinot (2009). Either case
generates an elasticity of substitution of unity and the sorting condition reduces to FFxy/(FxFy)   1,P
xili/
P
li and the total labor L =
P
li, whereas standard e ciency units only feature the product x¯L. (We thank an
anonymous referee for pointing this out.) While our framework does not replicate the generalized case when multiple types
are hired, our sorting condition remains valid as long as f˜ is convex in its first argument, as discussed in the Appendix.
17For a recent review article, see Chade, Eeckhout, and Smith (2016).
18Notice that the matching models by Tervio (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008), which explain the changes of CEO
compensation, are of this kind. While they use firm size to determine the type of firm, only one worker (the CEO) is
matched to one firm, where the firm size is exogenously given.
19In directed search with two-sided heterogeneity, a similar separable formulation arises where B represents the matching
technology (see Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)).
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or equivalently log-supermodularity of F in worker and firm types, which is the well-known condition
in this literature.
Supervision-time models have been amongst the first to allow sorting in the presence of interaction
with more than one worker. Here the firm or its manager has a unit amount of time to supervise workers.
The supervision time t(x, y) needed by each worker depends on both the manager’s and the worker’s
type. So r units of time allow the hiring of (no more than) r/t(x, y) workers, and this determines
firm size which is no longer a real choice variable once types are known. Sattinger (1975)’s seminal
work assumes that output equals size: F (x, y, l, r) = min{r/t(x, y), l}. If we approximate this non-
di↵erentiable output function by the inelastic limit of a CES production function with inputs r/t(x, y)
and l,20 sorting condition (11) requires t(x, y) to be log-supermodular in the inelastic limit, recovering
Sattinger’s condition. Related is Garicano (2000)’s model of problem solving that has been widely
applied in the macro and trade literature (e.g., Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006); Antra`s, Garicano,
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)). Here supervision time t(x) only depends on the worker’s ability to solve
problems, but managers themselves contribute directly to production by solving problems up to level y,
leading to output function F (x, y, l, r) = ymin{r/t(x), l}. Again approximation through a smooth CES
function recovers their condition that sorting is always positive. The beauty of these models is that they
incorporate sorting and their explicit structure allows extensions for example to multiple hierarchical
levels, but size is directly tied to types and does not allow a smooth extensive margin that is the heart
of most macro models.
“Smooth” Span of Control underlies much of the work in macro-economics on firm size distributions
and is inspired by Lucas (1978)’s seminal work.21 He assumed that managers with di↵erent types
leverage their time smoothly over a (homogeneous) workforce, which can be captured through F =
yl'(r/l), where ' summarizes decreasing returns due to span of control problems. With the specification
'(r/l) = (r/l)1   this recovers the common form in which a firm with a unit amount of resources has
decreasing returns in labor of form yl  . Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2011) extend the Lucas model to
allow for worker heterogeneity but worker skills are perfectly substitutable, as in models of e ciency
units of labor, so there is no sorting of managers and workers. Rosen (1982)’s supervision model can
be interpreted as introducing heterogeneous worker types into this framework through his production
function F = yl'(g(y)r/l, x).22 Parametrization with ' = min{ rlt(x) , 1} would exactly replicate Garicano
(2000), but instead, Rosen imposed the smoothness assumptions of standard neoclassical theory. Rosen
20The function F (x, y, l, r) = .([r/t(x, y)](" 1)/" + l(" 1)/")"/(" 1) approaches min{(r/t(x, y), l} as "! 0.
21Here we interpret span of control in sense of Lucas (1978), i.e., the number of workers managed. This also encompasses
the interpretation by Simon (1957) and Lydall (1959) who refer the to number of managers at a lower management level
who are supervised by a manager in the next higher level. In that early literature span of control is related to the shape
of a hierarchy and the Pareto coe cient describing the wage distribution in a hierarchy.
22Rosen (1982)’s equation (1) for output per worker can be written as g˜(y˜)'(y˜l/r, x), where y˜ is the firm type. For a
strictly monotone function g˜, we can relabel each firm type as y = g˜(y˜) so that output per worker is y'(g(y)r/l, x), where
g = g˜ 1, which yields the expression in the text.
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never analyzed his general version, but additionally assumed e ciency units of labor. Within our
framework we can apply our sorting condition (11) to study sorting in his general model, which yields
'12 ['1   '/[g(y)r/l]]   '2'11, where subscripts denote partial derivatives of ' and its arguments
(g(y)r/l, x) are suppressed. Careful inspection of this condition yields many insights: a positive '12 is
intuitively conducive to positive sorting as it captures the interaction between g(y) and x, but this turns
out only to be true if the elasticity of ' with respect to its first argument is above unity. Otherwise
decreasing returns to size kick in too much and the square bracket is negative, revealing again the
importance of size considerations for sorting. The converse that sorting influences firm size distributions
might also seem plausible, but again has not received any attention, possibly due to a lack of theory that
allows for sorting in conjunction with span of control. Empirical work on firm size distributions tends
to use the span of control approach since firm heterogeneity allows them to rationalize size di↵erences.
Input heterogeneity in such studies is usually absent or restricted to e ciency units. To illustrate the
role of such heterogeneity one can study changes within a country over time or between countries of
di↵erent levels of development. We briefly touch on the latter after discussing the role of generic capital
in the model.
The Skill Premium with Generic Capital Investment. Additional generic capital inputs can be
easily introduced as other factors of production into our framework. Consider a production process that
not only takes as inputs the amount of labor and of proprietary firm resources, but also some amount
k of a generic capital good, and creates output Fˆ (x, y, l, r, k). In this formulation k is allowed to be a
vector in case there is more than one capital good. Optimal use of resources requires F (x, y, l, r) =
maxk
h
Fˆ (x, y, l, r, k)  i0k
i
, where i is the vector of unit prices which the individual firm takes as given
and is either fixed to world market levels in a small open economy or otherwise determined by an
additional equilibrium condition that equates the capital demand across all firms to the aggregate
capital stock. Note that F is constant returns in the last two arguments if Fˆ is constant returns in
the last three arguments, and all the machinery in this paper can be applied. Recall the alternative
interpretation of our model (see footnote 5) in which any entrepreneur can hire input 1 at type x
at quantity l and input 2 of type r at quantity y to maximize Fˆ (x, y, l, r, k)   lwx(x)   rwy(y)   i0k
where wx and wy are the hedonic price schedules for each of the inputs (equal to the wages and profits
in our derivation). Labelling input 1 as “high-skilled” workers and input 2 as “low-skilled” workers,
this exactly captures the within-period interaction in the seminal work on the skill premium following
Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000), only there it is assumed that individuals within each
group are homogeneous. Our setup allows for within-group heterogeneity, when the skill premium
wy(y)/wx(x) becomes type-specific. Our sorting condition can be expressed in terms of F as defined
above. If there is only one generic capital good and k is simply a number, then rewriting the cross-
margin-complementarity condition (11) in terms of the new primitive yields the following condition for
positive assortative matching: FˆxyFˆlrFˆkk FˆxyFˆlkFˆrk FˆxkFˆykFˆlr   FˆxrFˆylFˆkk FˆxrFˆykFˆlk FˆxkFˆylFˆrk.
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This is obtained from applying equation (11) to F together with the fact that F solves the maximization
problem maxk
h
Fˆ (x, y, l, r, k)  i0k
i
. We expect that particular functional form assumptions for the
way that generic capital a↵ects the production process will simplify this condition and make it more
amenable for interpretation in specific cases.
The Misallocation Debate refers to empirical work that identified a non-trivial tail of large firms
in the US and other developed countries, whereas such a tail is absent in developing countries where
size is compressed at very low levels (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008)). The same holds for agricultural farms (Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2014)). Span of control models have been unable to rationalize the di↵erences, raising the worry
about misallocation of inputs away from the most productive firms in developing countries. While the
literature has discussed the role of input heterogeneity, we are not aware of frameworks that move beyond
either homogeneity or e ciency units. To illustrate how our framework might contribute, consider
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) who rely on farmer heterogeneity y and input l which represents
land in their setting, as well as some generic capital k that can be rented at unit cost i.23 Consider an
extension to their production function of form: f˜(x, y, l, k) = a(⌘(xk)⇢+(1 ⌘)(yl)⇢)  ⇢ with parameters
a, ⌘, ⇢,  . Farmer quality augments land holdings, but they consider only homogeneous inputs (x = 1)
despite a discussion section on heterogeneity. In the generalized form, x now simply augments capital
so that better inputs use capital more e ciently, even though many other specifications would fit within
our larger theory. Optimal profit given types and land holdings is f(x, y, l) = maxk f˜(x, y, l, k)   Rk,
which in line with discussion in the preceding paragraph allows us to use the results from the main body
that did not explicitly incorporate generic capital; in the Appendix we show that this parametrization
generates positive sorting. Taking the rental rate of generic capital and the remaining parameters
from Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014), we see that a mean-preserving spread in input heterogeneity
reduces heterogeneity in the distribution of land holdings across farms, as better firms buy less but
better land. There are indications that land quality in developing countries might be more dispersed,
which would then limit the right tail of large firms in such countries.24 Such dispersion would be an
e cient outcome given the supply of good land, rather than a distortion.
Figure 4 uses the parameters for the developing countries and shows how firms of di↵erent types
react to more dispersion: large ones shrink and small ones grow, in levels on the left and in percentage
terms on the right (details are described in the Appendix). Similar compressions that limit the right
23Note that k represents a generic input such as fertilizers or tractors, while r is a specific limit on the farmer such as
his time endowment. Note also that agriculture might be a particularly suitable application of our theory once generic
capital is included. Both in the US and in developing countries a farm is generally run by the farmer and his family and
their time endowment is the relevant resource constraint (contrary to intuition seasonal help is only a minor part of overall
farm labor, while generic capital in form of tractors is the main source of additional help). Also, the restriction that all
land within the farm is of equal quality might not be that restrictive if farmers choose where to locate and local land has
somewhat uniform quality.
24Variation in land quality as measured by satellite images is positively correlated with ethnolinguistic variation
(Michalopoulos (2012)) while ethnolinguistic variation is typically negatively related to GDP (Michalopoulos and Pa-
paioannou (2012)).
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Figure 4: Firm size distribution for di↵erent dispersion in x (x is log-normally distributed LN (0, 0.2),
i.e. log x is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 0.2, truncated at the bounds indicated in
the legend, with the measure of the truncated distribution normalized to one).
tail might occur in the context of industrial firms and their labor inputs, since dispersion of labor inputs
is negatively correlated with the overall level of education (Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001)). We do
not expect input heterogeneity to fully rationalize the di↵erences between countries. Rather, we aim to
provide a tool that allows a formal discussion of these issues and their importance. A full exploration
would require a re-estimation of the generalized framework and an endogenous determination of the
rental rates of capital within the larger economy beyond the single sector that is at the heart of our
theory.
Economic geography has long been concerned with how individuals choose to locate across space,
for example within di↵erent locations of a mono-centric city, though many models tend to abstract
from spatial sorting.25 We therefore consider a model of spatial sorting within the city. Let there be
a continuum of locations y relative to the center, each with space for construction hf (y). Agents with
budget x have quasi-linear preferences u(c, s) = c+ v(s) over consumption c and housing space s. The
budget constraint is c + ps(y)s = xg(y), where x is the worker skill and g(y) is an increasing function
representing the time at work rather than in commute. Then we can write the individual citizen x’s
optimization problem as xg(y) + v(h)   ps(y)s. Net of the transfers, the aggregate surplus for all l
citizens is given by F (x, y, l, r) = xg(y)l + v
 
r
l
 
l. It is easily verified that sorting condition (11) is
25Most work in new economic geography considers the location choice of homogeneous agents through indi↵erence
conditions. Related to our setup is in particular Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) who model the location of identical
citizens and incorporate productive as well as residential land use. Though agents are identical, they earn di↵erent wages
in di↵erent locations. The paper proves existence of a competitive equilibrium in this generalized location model which
endogenously can generate multiple business centers. For a model with spatial sorting between cities, see Eeckhout,
Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014).
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satisfied if v(·) is concave, so that individuals with high incomes locate centrally and those with low
incomes in the periphery.26
Relation to the General Equilibrium Literature. While the assortative matching literature
has made rather specific assumptions for multi-worker firms that we attempt to generalize, the combi-
natorial matching and general equilibrium literature has instead stayed general but has focussed mainly
on existence theorems rather than on characterizing sorting or wage patterns. The classic example in
the combinatorial matching literature by Kelso and Crawford (1982) proposes a many-to-one matching
framework in a finite economy and allow for arbitrary production externalities, both between the firm
and its workers and across the workers within the firm. In such a general setting it is well-known that
the stable equilibrium or the core may not exist, and Kelso and Crawford (1982) derive a su cient con-
dition for existence in a finite agent model, that of gross substitutes: adding another worker decreases
the marginal value of each existing worker. This condition is satisfied in our setting where externalities
are mainly between the firm and the workers while across-worker externalities are due to scarcity of
internal resources only, and scarcity becomes more binding when there are fewer workers. Gul and Stac-
chetti (1999) analyze the gross substitutes condition in the context of Walrasian equilibrium and show
existence and the relation between the Walrasian price and the payment in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism. In the context of auction design, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) analyze package bidding as a
model of many-to-one matching. Our model di↵ers from settings such as the Roy (1951) model and its
recent variants in e.g., Heckman and Honore (1990), where each firm (or sector) can absorb unbounded
numbers of agents. In our setup, the marginal product decreases as the firm grows larger. Models that
combine the Roy setup with decreasing returns due to price e↵ects such as Costinot (2009) do share
commonalities to our model that are discussed under multiplicative separability above.
Multiple Skill Inputs. The prediction of the model that each firm hires exactly one skill type
is obviously counterfactual. Firms do hire workers of di↵erent ability. And while there is mounting
evidence that most of the increase inequality in worker earnings is due to the increase between firms,
not within firms,27 the within firm inequality continues to be substantial and important. The reason
why in our model only one skill type is hired is because we assumed, despite the multiple levels of com-
plementarities between di↵erent inputs, there are no complementarities between di↵erent x’s. Not only
does this ensure that the gross substitutes condition for existence discussed in the previous paragraph
is satisfied, this assumption has allowed us to characterize the sorting and size patterns despite that
26A similar functional form is used in Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) to consider di↵erences between cities rather
than within the city, where in there model g(y) is replaced by a more agnostic time-varying productivity term that di↵ers
across cities. Clearly the sorting of more talented workers to more productive cities prevails.
27A sequence of recent empirical papers has documented in many countries that changes in wage inequality are driven
nearly exclusively by between-firm inequality rather than within-firm inequality, see Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) for
Germany; Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, and von Wachter (2015) and Barth, Bryson, Davis, and Freeman (2014) for the
US; Benguria (2015) for Brazil; and Vlachos, Lindqvist, and Hakanson (2015) for Sweden.
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fact that that the general many-to-many matching model is notoriously hard to analyze (Kelso and
Crawford (1982)).
To address the issue of the multiple skill inputs and in order to draw closer to the empirically observed
heterogeneity, we have generalized the model to a setting in which there are n distinct categories of
skilled workers, each with a distribution of skills xi, i = 1, ..., n. We think of these categories as
education. Output produced then needs inputs from the di↵erent education categories, and the firm
chooses the skill level xi for each of these categories i.
Consider therefore a technology with firm type y as before and n skilled inputs, xi for i = 1, ..., n.
We assume that these skill types are from disjoint sets and that there is no substitution between these
skills. Let the measure of these skills be Hw,i. Then the technology can be written as
f(x1, ✓1, , ..., xn, ✓n, y) = f(x,✓, y), (17)
where x = x1, ..., xn, ✓i =
li
ri
and ✓ = ✓1, ..., ✓n. Now an allocation are matchings: y = µi(xi) for all i.
In the case of PAM the market clearing (or feasibility) condition is satisfied for each category i:Z y
µi(xi)
✓i(s)h
f (s)ds =
Z x
x
hw,i(s)ds. (18)
Unfortunately, this is a complex problem for which we are not able to derive general conditions for
assortative equilibrium as in the n = 1 case.28 The problem is challenging even with two skill inputs
because of the complementarities between di↵erent skills and the associated sizes. Moreover, we know
from Kelso and Crawford (1982) that existence is not guaranteed, except under a condition of gross
substitutes. Finally, we can also not simply rewrite the conditions for sorting in terms of increasing
di↵erences (as in the one-to-one matching model) because now it is not simply a matter of rearranging
types, there are also quantities. However, here we show that under some assumptions, we can make
progress in solving this allocation problem.
First, we assume that each category i produces output exactly as in our baseline model, that is, we
write output as an aggregation g of the output of each category i:
f(x,✓, y) = g(f1(x1, y, ✓1), ..., f
n(xn, y, ✓n)). (19)
We require output to be concave in ✓i, i.e., giif i✓ + gif
i
✓✓ < 0 where gi and gii denotes the partial first
and second derivative with respect to the i0th argument. Clearly this condition is met if g is concave
in each argument. We also require gi > 0. Again define F i(x, y, l, r) = rf i(x, y, l/r) as under n = 1.
This functional form in equation (19) will allow us to express the conditions for sorting in terms of the
28Even with n = 2, the Hessian from which we derive the sorting condition is now a 4 ⇥ 4 matrix that needs to be
negative definite. After substituting for the di↵erentiated first order conditions, the determinant of the Hessian becomes
an expression with many di↵erent interactions that are complicated to handle. The derivation is reported in the online
appendix.
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each individual function f i and associated F i as in the case of n = 1, in combination with properties on
g. Clearly, additive separability where g(f1, ..., fn) =
P
i f
i is a special case in which we immediately
obtain the results from Propositions 1 and 2 extend for each skill input: there is PAM between y and
xi provided F ixy  
F iylF
i
xr
F ilr
(NAM under the opposite sign) and the di↵erential equations (14) and (15)
fully characterize the equilibrium allocation µi(xi) for each i. Separability implies that the allocation
problem of each skill input xi is solved in isolation and can easily be verified that the conditions for
negative definiteness of Hessian of the full problem coincide with the negative definiteness of each
allocation problem of F i in isolation. Only now di↵erent worker types associated with the same firm y
are bundled together for observational purposes. The subsequent analysis aims to extend this to more
meaningful aggregators.
Second, assume that each category i makes its own hiring decisions, aiming to maximize the overall
profitability of the firm. We will refer to this as “independent hiring”. That is, we assume each unit
i = 1, ..., n solves the problem
max
xi,✓i
g(f(x,✓, y)) 
X
i
✓iwi(xi). (20)
This is a simpler problem than the full problem of a single firm that maximizes over all x1, ..., xn and
✓1, ..., ✓n simultaneously:
max
x,✓
g(f(x,✓, y)) 
X
i
✓iwi(xi). (21)
Problem (20) might be reasonable in some larger organizations where coordination between units is
di cult and each unit optimizes its allocation independently. More importantly, this also has the
advantage to yield a simpler pass at the di cult overall problem (21). A solution to the general
problem (21) is also a solution to the problem (20). One way to see this is to notice that the 2n
first-order conditions of both sets of problems are identical. The main di↵erences are the second-order
conditions, which are more demanding in the general problem than in the simplified one. Nevertheless,
if we can prove conditions that apply to all equilibria of the simplified setting (for example, conditions
for positive assortative matching that apply PAM for all such equilibria), we have also shown that these
apply in the general problem.
With these two restrictions we now derive a set of su cient conditions on the technology such
that there is assortative matching. The reason why we need additional restrictions is that along the
equilibrium allocation f i(⌫i(y), y, ✓i(⌫i(y))) may not be increasing in y, where ✓i(x) is the size of the
workforce of type x and ⌫i(y) is the worker type i hired by firm y. Because the function g is monotonic
in each argument, then a decreasing f i may make the solution not positively assortative in another
dimension j, precisely because it is increasing in its arguments and supermodular. To that end, we
calculate the total derivative of f i with respect to y along its equilibrium allocation, which we denote
by the total derivative dF j/dy. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Consider the model with multiple skill inputs f(x,✓, y) = g(f1(xi, y, ✓1), ..., fn(xn, y, ✓n))
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and independent hiring; a necessary condition for PAM requires along the equilibrium path for all
i 2 1, ..., n:
(gi)
2
⇥
F ixiyF
i
liri   F iyliF ixiri
⇤
+ gigii
"
 F
i
r2i
+
F iri
ri
# ⇥
F ixiyF
i
li   F iyliF ixi
⇤
+gi
24giiF iy
ri
+
X
j 6=i
gij
dF j
dy
35 ⇥F iliriF ixi   F ixiriF ili⇤   0. (22)
If this holds for all (x, l, r, y) in a candidate equilibrium satisfying the first order conditions to (20)
with given dF
j
dy , then this allocation is an equilibrium with PAM. If this holds for all (x, l, r, y) and all
possible dF
j
dy , then any equilibrium has to be PAM.
Proof. In Appendix.
The next proposition establishes that if the production function is convex and supermodular, our
condition for sorting together with the condition that more productive firms are larger under any type
densities, coupled with a new condition on the interplay with size, ensures even in the multi-unit setting
an equilibrium that is PAM and more productive firms are larger:
Proposition 4 Consider the model with multiple skill inputs f(x,✓, y) = g(f1(xi, y, ✓1), ..., fn(xn, y, ✓n))
and independent hiring, and assume that higher type firms y produce more output. A su cient condi-
tion for an equilibrium under PAM in which more productive firms are larger and produce more (i.e.,
dF j/dy   0) is: gij   0 for all (i, j) 2 {1, 2, .., n}2 with i 6= j, and for all i and all (x, l, r, y) it holds
that
F ixiyF
i
liri   F iyliF ixiri   0, (23)
F iyli   0, F ixiri  0 (24)
gii
✓⇥
F iliriF
i
xi   F ixiriF il
⇤
F iy  
⇥
F ixiyF
i
l   F iyliF ixi
⇤
F il
li
ri
◆
  0. (25)
Proof. In Appendix.
If g is concave in each argument (i.e., gii < 0) then the last condition highlights naturally that a
large F ixiy is a force towards positive sorting while Fyli large is a force against it. This is in spirit similar
but in functional form di↵erent from our main condition (23) that carries over from the model with
n = 1.
Finally, we provide a short illustration that we obtain very simple conditions for sorting for a specific
technology. Consider the setting where output is given by f = ⇧if i(xi, y, li). In this case the aggregator
g is multiplicative in f i, and we can prove that the condition for PAM in the benchmark model with
n = 1 extends to each of the technologies F i for each category i.
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Corollary 2 Let F i = Ai(xi, y)Bi(li, ri) where Bi = l
 i
i r
1  i
i ( i 2 (0, 1)), and let gii  0. A su cient
condition for positive assortative matching in any equilibrium with independent hiring is that for all i:
F ixiyF
i
liri   F iyliF ixiri > 0. (26)
Therefore, any equilibrium where a single firm jointly makes all hiring decisions also displays positive
assortative matching.
Proof. In Appendix.
This condition to be satisfied for each skill group i is the same as the condition with a single skill
input (11). Observe that this condition does not require that output of any given skill category j is
increasing along the equilibrium allocation. Any e↵ect a decreasing output of input j could have on
the optimal choice of skill i is neutralized by the linearity of g and the Cobb-Douglas functional form
of B(l, r). Note also that the condition in the Corollary is su cient, not necessary. For example, gii
may be positive as long as   is not too large.
This can be applied to the technology that we used to derive the example in section 3 in the
benchmark case, but now let n = 2. Let g be multiplicative so that g(f1, f2) = f1 · f2 with associated
aggregates F i = A(xi, y)B(li, ri) where A is CES and B is Cobb-Douglas. Then firm y’s output
g(f1(x1, y, ✓1), f2(x2, y, ✓2)) can be written as:
g =
✓
!1x
 1 1
 1
1 + (1  !1)y
 1 1
 1
1
◆  1
 1 1
✓ 11 ·
✓
!2x
 2 1
 2
2 + (1  !2)y
 2 1
 2
2
◆  2
 2 1
✓ 22 . (27)
For this technology, there will be PAM for all  i 2 (0, 1) provided that  i < 1 for all i, where the latter
condition follows from equation (26).
Extensions that allow for monopolistic competition at the output level within a Dixit-Stiglitz setup
are presented in the Appendix, where an extended condition for sorting is derived. There we link our
model to the optimal transportation literatureand also introduce endogenous type distributions.
5 Sorting with Large Firms and Search frictions
Questions about sorting between workers and firms have attracted interest not only for competitive
markets, but increasingly also for markets with matching frictions. Incorporating matching frictions
allows us to study not only matching and wage patterns but also the determinants of unemployment
across heterogeneously skilled agents (see, e.g., Shimer and Smith (2000) and Atakan (2006) in the
presence of random search and Shi (2001), Shimer (2005) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) under
directed search). At the same time, multi-worker matching has recently attracted attention in that
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literature to analyze how queue lengths vary across firms of di↵erent sizes (e.g., Smith (1999) for
random and Menzio and Moen (2010), Garibaldi and Moen (2010), Hawkins (2011), Kaas and Kircher
(2015), and Schaal (2015) for directed search), yet, little is known about how unemployment varies in
the presence of sorting and variation in firm size jointly.29 The contribution of the extension of the
model developed here is to enable the joint analysis of firm size, search frictions and sorting.
We now show that the techniques developed in this paper are suitable to analyze search frictions with
large firms and sorting; notably the sorting condition for PAM remains unchanged at FxyFlr   FxlFyr
and is thus independent of the search frictions. Obviously the matching technology does a↵ect the
equilibrium allocation and the unemployment rate, and we derive predictions about the unemployment
rate of various worker types and the vacancy rate across firms. To illustrate that our model is amenable
to this, we embed a costly recruiting and search process in the previous setup in order to capture
the hiring behavior of large firms. We first formally lay out the search model, then relate it to the
competitive economy we studied thus far, and finally we use this connection to prove theorems about
the search economy.
The Directed Search Economy with Two-Sided Heterogeneity and Large Firms. This
setup builds on the directed search literature cited above, combining insights from one-to-one sorting
and large firms into one framework. As in the previous literature, we assume for simplicity’s sake that
workers and firms are risk-neutral. Consider a situation where the workers are unemployed and can
only be hired by firms via a frictional hiring process. Following Shi (2001), firms post for each vacancy
the type of worker they want to hire and the wage. That is, if firm y dedicates a vacancy to worker
type x, it specifies wage !y(x). But now, a firm of type y decides also how many vacancies vy(x) to
post per unit of resources devoted to workers of type x that it wants to hire. We assume that all vy(x)
vacancies have the same wage !y(x), but it is easy to show that this assumption is without loss of
generality. Posting vy(x) vacancies has a linear cost cvy(x). Observing all vacancy postings, workers
decide where to search for a job amongst those dedicated to their type. Let qy(x) denote the “queue” of
workers searching for a particular wage o↵er, defined as the number of workers per vacancy. Frictions
in the hiring process make it impossible to fill a position for sure. Rather, the probability of filling a
vacancy is a function of the number of workers queueing for this vacancy, denoted by m (qy(x)), which
is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. Since there are qy(x) workers queueing per
vacancy, the job-finding rate is m(qy(x))/qy(x), it is assumed to be strictly decreasing in the number
of workers qy(x) queueing per vacancy.
Workers expect to obtain an expected equilibrium payo↵ of w(x). Firms can attract workers to
their vacancies as long as these workers get in expectation their equilibrium payo↵, meaning that qy(x)
adjusts depending on !y(x) to satisfy: !y(x)m(qy(x))/qy(x) = w(x). Often w(x) is called the ”market
29Lentz (2010) and Bagger and Lentz (2016) study sorting when firm size is limited only by search frictions, albeit with
linear production and with no interaction of workers within the production process of the firm.
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utility” as it represents the return that workers could get by queueing elsewhere for a job. Note the
di↵erence between the wage !y(x) which is paid when a worker is actually hired, and the expected wage
w(x) of a queueing worker who does not yet know whether he will be hired or not. In equilibrium the
firm takes the latter as given because this is the utility that workers can ensure themselves by searching
for a job at other firms, while the former is the firm’s choice variable with which it can a↵ect how many
workers will queue for its jobs. Therefore, a firm maximizes instead of (3) the new problem
max
Ry ,✓y ,!y ,vy
Z
[f(x, y, ✓y(x))  ✓y(x)!y(x)  vy(x)c] dRy(x) (28)
s.t. ✓y(x) = vy(x)m(qy(x)); and !y(x)m(qy(x))/qy(x) = w(x)
and Ry(x) integrates to unity. The first line simply takes into account that the firm must pay the
vacancy-creation cost. The second line states that the number of hires equals the number of vacancies
times the job-filling rate, and links the job-filling rate to the wage o↵er as explained earlier.
The amount of workers with types below x queueing at firms of type y is now L˜y(x) = R xx ✓y(x˜)dRy(x˜).
Clearly, feasibility requires that no more workers can be queueing than there are in the economy, i.e.,
for all x0 and x it has to hold thatZ
y
h
L˜y(x)  L˜y(x0)
i
dHf  Hw(x) Hw(x0). (29)
Finally, workers’ wage expectations w(x) must be consistent with the expected payments that firms are
willing to make in equilibrium. In particular, if wage expectations w(x00) for almost all workers x00 in
some interval (x0, x] are strictly positive, then there must be enough vacancies that actually o↵er such
wages: all these workers must actually be queueing for jobs that o↵er such wages (as workers who do
not queue cannot obtain a strictly positive payo↵). Therefore, equation (29) cannot be slack, which
leads to the following equilibrium definition for a directed search economy with large firms:
Definition 2 An equilibrium in a directed search economy is a tuple of functions (w, ✓y,!y, vy,Ry,Ly)
consisting of a non-negative market utility w(x) as well as intensity functions ✓y(x), vacancy function
vy(x), actual pay !y(x), and resource allocations Ry(x) with associated feasible L˜y(x) such that
1. Optimality: For any y the combination (✓y,!y, vy,Ry) solves (28).
2. Correct Wage Expectations: (29) holds with equality if the market utility is strictly positive a.e.
on (x0, x].
Relation to a Competitive Economy. We now show that a relabeling of variables allows us to
represent this economy as if it were a competitive market economy. This allows us to use the insights
from the previous sections to provide insights even in the case of search frictions. The main idea is the
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following: in the current setup qy(x) and vy(x) determine the number sy(x) = qy(x)vy(x) of workers
who search for jobs (per unit of resource). Alternatively, the firm could choose sy(x) and vy(x), and
then qy(x) = sy(x)/vy(x) follows. Moreover, instead of maximizing over sy(x) and vy(x) simultaneously,
the firm can first determine sy(x) and then choose vy subsequently to maximize the following problem:
g(x, y, s) = max
v
[f(x, y, vm(s/v))  vc] (30)
where we replaced ✓ in (28) by the constraint ✓ = vm(q) = vm(s/v). Problem 30 is strictly convex, and
the unique optimum v⇤(x, y, s) is given by the first order conditionm(q)[1 qm0(q)/m(q)]fl(x, y, sm(q)/q) =
c, where q = s/v⇤. This corresponds to the well-known Hosios condition for e cient search. Simple
replacement then transforms (28) and (29) and associated Definition 2 into the following equivalent
ones:
max
Ry ,sy
Z
[g(x, y, sy(x))  sy(x)w(x)] dRy(x) (31)
where Ry integrates to unit; Ly(x) = R xx sy(x˜)dRy(x˜) andZ
y
⇥Ly(x)  Ly(x0)⇤ dHf  Hw(x) Hw(x0); (32)
and (w, sy,Ry,Ly) constitutes an equilibrium if (sy Ry) solves (31) and if Ly satisfies (32), with equality
if w(x00) > 0 for allmost all types in (x, x0]. Observe that this is exactly our definition of a competitive
equilibrium, only now with fictitious production function g that embeds both the production as well as
the matching process. Note that this works precisely because the firm has to pay any “searcher” that
queues for a job the expected wage, whether or not it ends up getting the job. Note G(x, y, s, r) =
rg(x, y, s/r) provides the aggregate production function, which has constant returns to scale in s and r
by construction. We sum up the connection between the directed search economy and the competitive
economy in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The expected wages (market utility) and matching patterns in a competitive search
economy with type distributions Hf and Hw and production function F (x, y, l, r) coincide with those
of a competitive economy with same type distributions but fictional production function G(x, y, s, r) =
maxv
⇥
F (x, y, rvm( svr ), r)  rvc
⇤
. Moreover, for types that match in equilibrium vy(x) = v⇤(x, y, s),
qy(x) = sy(x)/v⇤(x, y, s), and ✓y(x) and !y(x) are then determined as in the constraint in (28).
Results for Competitive Search with Large Firms. The beauty of the previous result is that
G is fully determined by the primitives, and we can apply the tools we laid out in Section 2 (where now
G replaces F ). The firm can be viewed as if it hires “searchers” who must be paid their expected wage.
Applying the machinery from the previous section allows us to assess whether sorting is assortative,
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and surprisingly our cross-partial condition on G reduces to the standard cross-partial condition on F,
so no further requirements need to be imposed for sorting:
Proposition 6 In the framework with directed search frictions, a necessary condition to have equilibria
with positive assortative matching under any arbitrary distribution of types is that inequality (11) holds
for all (x, y, l, r) 2 R4++ that satisfy fl(x, y, l/r) > c. If equation (11) holds with strict inequality on this
domain, it is also su cient to ensure that any equilibrium entails positive assortative matching. The
opposite inequality provides a necessary and su cient condition for negative assortative matching.
Proof. In Appendix.
Intuitively, the reason for this result is that vacancies can be adjusted at linear costs to absorb the
distortions in the matching function, and ultimately the driving force for sorting remains on the pro-
duction side.30 The main reason why we only need our sorting condition for combinations of (x, y, l, r)
such that fl(x, y, l/r) > c is due to the fact that a number of searchers s leads to optimal vacancies v⇤,
but only to the level where the cost of posting can be covered.
The next question concerns the matching probabilities and the size of the firm. Let l(x) denote
again the equilibrium size of the firm in which worker type x is employed. While the sign of sorting
is not dependent on the matching function, the condition whether higher-type firms are larger, does.
This is suggested already by the definition of firm size:
l(x) = s(x)m(q(x))/q(x), (33)
where s(x) and q(x) are again the equilibrium values for the number of searchers and the queue lengths,
andm(q)/q is the matching probability of the worker. The matching probability depends on the optimal
number of vacancies. Rather than studying firm size directly, it is convenient to start with the workers
matching probabilities for which we obtain an unambiguous result:
Proposition 7 Assume higher worker types create more output (Fx > 0). In the competitive search
equilibrium with large firms, higher skilled workers have lower market tightness (q(x) decreasing) and
associated higher matching probability. For types with strictly positive expected wages w(x) > 0 these
relationships are strict.
Proof. In appendix.
Since better workers obtain higher expected payo↵ w(x) as determined in Problem 1 (otherwise a
firm could hire better workers at equal cost), they face proportionally lower competition for each job
30We expect the matching function to matter more if the marginal cost of posting vacancies increase with the number of
vacancies that are posted. With convex creation costs we expect results to feature the matching function more prominently,
and in extreme cases where some vacancies are costless but after a threshold costs increase to infinity we expect sorting
conditions that resemble those of settings where each firm can post one vacancy.
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and correspondingly higher job finding probabilities. This outcome arises because the opportunity costs
of having high skilled workers unsuccessfully queue for employment is higher, and therefore firms are
more willing to create enough vacancies to enable most of these applicants to actually get hired for the
job. Note that this result is independent of the sorting patterns.
The sorting patterns matter when one wants to study the link between firm productivity, the
vacancy-filling probability and the vacancy rate v/l, which are often used in empirical work. Since
we know how these are linked to worker characteristics, we can link them to firm productivities under
sorting. But since size is not necessarily increasing with productivity, there is no direct link to firm
size:
Proposition 8 In a competitive search equilibrium the vacancy rate (v/l) is increasing and the vacancy
filling probability is decreasing in firm productivity (y) under PAM, and the reverse under NAM. They
are ambiguous in firm size.
Proof. In Appendix.
Finally, conditions for overall firm size are dependent both on the production and the matching
function. Consider again the setting with Fx > 0. Su cient conditions for increasing size under PAM
is that the number of searchers s is increasing in productivity, i.e., that H(x)Gyl   Gxr. This resembles
part 1. of Corollary 1 and ensures a larger number of searchers, s(x) is increasing, which then is
reinforced by the higher matching rate that these have (Proposition 7), and leads more productive
firms to be larger overall. Under NAM these two counteract, and size conditions depend in an intricate
way on the matching and production function.
6 Concluding Remarks
Assortative Matching is prevalent across firms of di↵erent sizes. We propose a tractable theory of the
labor market where firms choose both the quality of the work force and the quantity. This allows us to
study sorting and firm size simultaneously. Whether assortative matching is positive now depends on a
tradeo↵ of complementarities between types, between quantities, and across types and quantities. The
equilibrium allocation is completely characterized by a system of di↵erential equations that pins down
the allocation, the firm size distribution and the wage distribution.
Our model provides a unified approach to a number of existing models in the macro, labor and
industrial organization literatures. While su ciently rich to incorporate the most relevant features of
heterogeneity, in particular worker skill, firm productivity, firm size and wage inequality our model is
remarkably simple to analyze and can readily be used to plug into a larger model of the economy. As
an example, we establish that equilibrium unemployment can be incorporated, thus enabling the joint
analysis of frictional unemployment in the presence of both sorting of heterogeneous workers and firms,
and of assortative matching in large firms.
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Appendix A Omitted Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Proceed by contradiction. Assume a positive measure of resources is placed by active firm y on a
set of worker types X˜ such that (x, ✓y(x)) does not solve (max-problem-simple). Let (x⇤, ✓⇤) be an opti-
mizer of (6). Firm profits can be decomposed into the sum of
R
x2X\X˜ [f(x, y, ✓
y(x)) w(x)✓y(x)]dRy(x)
and
R
x2X˜ [f(x, y, ✓
y(x)) w(x)✓y(x)]dRy(x) where the first term captures the profits with worker types
in X \X˜ and the second term captures the profits with worker types in X˜ . Placing all resources that the
firm places on types in X˜ instead on type x⇤ and choosing an intensity at x⇤ of ✓⇤ leaves the first term
unchanged but changes the second term to
R
x2X˜ [f(x
⇤, y, ✓⇤) w(x⇤)✓⇤]dRy(x), which strictly improves
profits since the integrant has strictly increased.
A.2 Convex Preferences, Existence, and Welfare Theorems
One can interpret our economy in terms of a classical exchange economy: “Consumers” in the classical
model are our firms y 2 Y. They consume a bundles (Ly, ny) where Ly denotes the amounts of labor of
various types employed by firm y and ny is the amount of numeraire it consumes. To make this an en-
dowment economy, assume that each firm is initially endowed with some of the workers and a su ciently
high level of the numeraire. The exact endowment of workers to firms does not matter because of the
presence of the numeraire, so endowing each firm with the average distribution of workers would su ce.
Firm preferences are represented by utility function u(Ly, ny|y) = ny + maxRy
R
f(x, y, ✓y(x))dRy(x)
such that ✓y(x) = dLy/dRy and R dRy < 1 where the first term captures the numeraire and the second
optimal production. If these preferences are convex, we can apply Ostroy (1984) or Khan and Yannelis
(1991) for existence and the former for core equivalence.
Lemma 2 Firm preferences are convex.
Proof. Consider three bundles (Ly, ny), (L0y, n0y) and (L00y, n00y) such that u(Ly, ny|y)   u(L00y, n00y|y)
and u(L0y, n0y|y)   u(L00y, n00y|y). We then establish that u(↵Ly + (1   ↵)L0y,↵ny + (1   ↵)n0y|y)  
u(L00y, n00y|y) for any ↵ 2 (0, 1) since the firm can simply assign a fraction ↵ of its internal resources to
workers with distribution Ly and the remainder to the other workers, that is
u(↵Ly + (1  ↵)L0y,↵ny + (1  ↵)n0y|y) (34)
= ↵ny + (1  ↵)n0y + max
Ry s.t.
✓y(x)=d(↵Ly+(1 ↵)L0y)/dRyR
dRy<1
Z
f(x, y, ✓y(x))dRy(x) (35)
  ↵ny + (1  ↵)n0y + max
Ry s.t.
✓y(x)=↵dLy/dRyR
dRy<↵
Z
f(x, y, ✓y(x))dRy(x) + max
Ry s.t.
✓y(x)=(1 ↵)dL0y/dRyR
dRy<1 ↵
Z
f(x, y, ✓y(x))dRy(x)(36
= ↵u(Ly, ny|y) + (1  ↵)u(Ly, ny|y) (37)
  u(L00y, n00y|y). (38)
A.3 Sorting with monotone production and smooth distributions
Lemma 3 If output F is strictly increasing in x and y and the type distributions have non-zero contin-
uous densities, then almost all active firm types y hire exactly one worker type ⌫(y) and reach unique
size l(y) in an assortative equilibrium.
Proof. First, note that optimality requires that for any given firm type y almost all its choices
x 2suppLy and ✓y(x) solve problem (6) by Lemma 1. Next, observe that if x is in the support of the
labor demand Ly for any firm y, then all x0 > x have to be active. If not, the wage for the higher type
x0 is w(x0) = 0 and therefore weakly below w(x), but x0 produces more output than x, which violates
that x is optimal for firm y (formally: it violates that x is in the support of Ly as all types in a small
enough neighborhood around x such that their type is below x0 fail to maximize (6)).
Next, we show that an assortative equilibrium requires that almost all active firm types hire only
one worker type. We proceed by contradiction. Assume this were not true, i.e., for any type y in a set
of active firm types Y 0 with strictly positive measure it holds that the support of its labor demand Ly
contains more then one element. Assortativeness still means that for almost all active firm types with
y > y0 it holds that x is in the support of Ly and x0 is in the support of Ly0 only if x   x0. In particular,
this applies also to almost all types in Y 0. So for a non-generic y 2 Y 0 with x and x˜ > x in the support
of its labor demand Ly the following has to hold: almost all firms with higher types have labor demands
that only place support on types above x˜, while almost all firm types below have labor demands that
only place support on types below x. Therefore, labor demand for all worker types in interval (x, x˜) has
measure zero, but the supply of workers in this set has strictly positive mass since the type distributions
have non-zero densities. Market clearing then implies that wages are almost everywhere zero for the
types in (x, x˜), meaning that these types are inactive which violates the previous paragraph.
Finally, given a unique choice x = v(y), there exists a unique choice of intensity (or firm size). Since
optimality requires solving (6), and this problem is strictly concave in intensity, there is a uniquely
optimal intensity choice.
A.4 Derivations for Assortative Matching Omitted in the Text
Here we lay out the derivations that follow from the firm’s maximization problem (6) in Lemma 1 to
the sorting conditions that are built up towards Proposition 1.
Maximization (6) gives rise to first order conditions (7) and (8). The second order condition for
optimality requires the Hessian H to be negative definite, where:
H =
✓
f✓✓ fx✓   w0(x)
fx✓   w0(x) fxx   ✓w00(x)
◆
. (39)
This requires f✓✓ to be negative and the determinant |H| to be positive, or
f✓✓[fxx   ✓w00(x)]  (fx✓   w0(x))2   0. (40)
We can di↵erentiate (7) and (8) with respect to the worker type to get
fx✓   w0(x) =  µ0(x)fy✓   ✓0(x)f✓✓ (41)
fxx   ✓(x)w00(x) =  µ0(x)fxy   ✓0(x)
⇥
fx✓   w0(x)
⇤
. (42)
In the following three lines we successively substitute (42), (41) and then (8) into condition (40):
 µ0(x)f✓✓fxy  
⇥
✓0(x)f✓✓ + fx✓   w0(x)
⇤ ⇥
fx✓   w0(x)
⇤
> 0 (43)
 µ0(x)f✓✓fxy + µ0(x)fy✓
⇥
fx✓   w0(x)
⇤
> 0 (44)
 µ0(x)[f✓✓fxy   fy✓fx✓ + fy✓fx/✓] > 0 (45)
Since f✓✓ < 0 we can divide by  f✓✓ to get the condition reported in the main body. For strictly
positive assortative matching (µ0(x) > 0) it has to hold that the term in square brackets in the last line
is negative, for strictly negative assortative matching the term in square brackets in the last line needs
to be positive. Focusing on positive assortative matching, and using the relationship in (8), we obtain
the condition:
f✓✓fxy   fy✓fx✓ + fy✓fx/✓  0. (46)
This condition can be summarized more conveniently in terms of the original function F (x, y, r, s),
for which we know that F (x, y, ✓, 1) = f(x, y, ✓). The following relationships will also prove useful.
Homogeneity of degree one of F in l and r implies that  Flr = ✓Fll. Since F is constant returns, so
is Fx.31 A standard implication of constant returns is then Fx(x, y, ✓, 1) = ✓Fxl + Fxr. We can now
rewrite (46) in terms of F (x, y, ✓, 1) and rearrange to obtain the following cross-margin-complementarity
condition:
FllFxy   Fyl [Fxl   Fx/✓]  0 (47)
, FllFxy + FylFxr/✓  0
, FxyFlr   FylFxr. (48)
Since Flr > 0, we can divide through to obtain inequality (11) in Proposition 1. This derivation provides
a necessary condition for assortative matching for the specific conditions with increasing output and
non-zero type densities. It does not deal with distributions that have mass points, nor does it provide
su cient conditions to rule out the existence of other equilibria, for example those where the bottom
half of workers matches positively assortatively with the top half of firms and the top half of workers
matches positively assortatively with the bottom half of firms. The following proof of Proposition 1
accounts for these cases.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part I: su ciency. Focus on su ciency for positive assortative matching. (The same logic
applies to negative assortative matching.) We need to prove that the strict version of inequality (11) is
su cient to rule out any equilibria that are not positive assortative. This part of the proof relies on the
first welfare theorem. Since we have quasi-linear utility, Pareto optimality requires output maximization.
A feasible collection of labor demands L = {Ly}y2Y and resource allocations R= {Ry}y2Y for all firm
types yields aggregate output
S(L,R) =
Z
y2Y
Z
x2X
F (x, y, ✓y(x), 1)dRydHf , (49)
where ✓y = dLy/dRy. The first welfare theorem implies that the equilibrium (L⇤,R⇤) combination
yields a weakly higher aggregate output than any other feasible (L,R) combination. In the following
we will show that if (11) holds strictly, then any allocation (L,R) that is not positive assortative can be
improved upon by some (positive assortative) reallocation of workers that improves aggregate output,
and therefore (L,R) cannot be an equilibrium.
Assume that Fxy >
FxrFyl
Flr
for all (x, y, l, r) 2 R4++ but an equilibrium allocation (L,R) is not positive
assortative. The lack of positive sorting implies that two combinations (x1, y1, ✓1) and (x2, y2, ✓2) exist
with x1 > x2 but y1 < y2, that have strictly positive probability: i.e., for any " there is a strictly positive
measure of firm types in any " neighborhood around yi with labor demands whose support includes
31It holds that F (x, y, l, r) = rF (x, y, l/r, 1), so di↵erentiation implies that Fx(x, y, l, r) = rFx(x, y, l/r, 1)
worker types in an " neighborhood around xi that obtain resources at intensity in an " neighborhood
around ✓i. These firms are active as otherwise the support of their labor demand would be empty, and
for active firms optimality requires a strictly positive intensity, so we can focus on combinations with
✓i > 0. The rest of the proof will proceed by assuming that a mass of workers of type xi is employed
by firms yi and receives resources with intensity ✓i, and we will show that assigning some of the low
type workers to the low type firms while assigning some of the high type worker to the high type firms
strictly increases output, yielding a contradiction to the First Welfare Theorem. If this is the case, then
the same argument holds if the mass of workers is not at (xi, yi, ✓i) but in its neighborhood, since for
a small enough neighborhood the output is arbitrarily close to the output that arises if all mass were
concentrated only on the exact point, by continuity of F. We proceed in two steps. Step 1 has the key
insight.
1. Establish the marginal benefit from assigning additional workers to some resource type:
Consider some (x, y, ✓) such that a total measure r of resources is deployed in this match (where r
is the product of the number of firms and their internal resources deployed to x workers at intensity
✓). To achieve this intensity, they are obviously paired with the appropriate number of workers (of
measure ✓r). As a preliminary step to the variational argument that follows, we are interested in the
marginal benefit of pairing an additional measure rˆ of resources of type yˆ firms with workers of type
x. The optimal output is generated by withdrawing some optimal measure ✓ˆrˆ of the workers that were
supposed to be working with resources of type y and reassigning them to work with resources of type
yˆ. The joint output at (x, y) and (x, yˆ) in (49) is given by
rf(x, y, ✓   ✓ˆrˆ/r) + rˆf(x, yˆ, ✓ˆ). (50)
Optimality of ✓ˆ requires, according to the first order condition, that f✓(x, y, ✓   ✓ˆrˆ/r) = f✓(x, yˆ, ✓ˆ),
which shows that the optimal ✓ˆ is itself a function of rˆ. Denote  (yˆ;x, y, ✓) the marginal increase of
(50) from increasing rˆ, evaluated at rˆ = 0, is given by
 (yˆ;x, y, ✓) = f(x, yˆ, ✓ˆ)  ✓ˆf✓(x, y, ✓) (51)
where ✓ˆ is determined by f✓(x, yˆ, ✓ˆ) = f✓(x, y, ✓). (52)
The constraint (52) reiterates the optimality of ✓ˆ. Sometimes we will write ✓ˆ(yˆ;x, y, ✓) to highlight
that ✓ˆ is a function of yˆ, y, x and ✓.
2. Not-PAM has strictly positive marginal benefits from matching the high types:
We started under the assumption that matching is not assortative, so that x1 is matched to y1 at
intensity ✓1 and x2 to y2 at intensity ✓2, but x1 > x2 while y1 < y2. For this to be e cient, it must be
more e cient to pair the last unit of resources of type yˆ = y1 to workers with combination (x1, y1, ✓1)
than with workers that are otherwise matched at (x2, y2, ✓2):
 (y1;x2, y2, ✓2)   (y1;x1, y1, ✓1), (53)
where  (·; ·, ·, ·) was defined in (51). Similarly, the marginal gains from pairing the last unit of resources
of type yˆ = y2 to workers otherwise matched at (x2, y2, ✓2) than to workers matched at (x1, y1, ✓1):
 (y2;x2, y2, ✓2)    (y2;x1, y1, ✓1). (54)
We will show that if (53) holds, then (54) cannot hold, which yields the desired contradiction. Start
by assuming that (53) is true. Now consider any yˇ   y1 for which
 (yˇ;x2, y2, ✓2) =  (yˇ;x1, y1, ✓1). (55)
Observe that such a yˇ exists, by continuity of  (y0, ., ., .) in y0. Assuming (53), if (54) also holds then
there must be such a yˇ by the Intermediate value theorem (if there is none, then we already know that
(54) cannot hold).
We will show that at this yˇ the marginal increase
 1(yˇ;x2, y2, ✓2) <  1(yˇ;x1, y1, ✓1). (56)
Given (53), this immediately implies that  (yˆ;x2, y2, ✓2) <  (yˆ;x1, y1, ✓1) for all yˆ > y1 (because around
any point of equality the right hand side grows strictly faster then the left hand side in yˆ). Therefore
the strict inequality applies in particular also for yˆ = y2 and contradicts (54), which completes this part
of the proof.
To show equation (56), observe first that the marginal increase of   with respect to yˆ in (51) is
given by
 1(yˆ;x, y, ✓) = fy(x, yˆ, ✓ˆ), (57)
where ✓ˆ is again determined as in (52). So (56) is equivalent to
fy(x2, yˇ, ✓ˆ2) < fy(x1, yˇ, ✓ˆ1) (58)
where ✓ˆ1 = ✓ˆ(yˇ;x1, y1, ✓1) and ✓ˆ2 = ✓ˆ(yˇ;x2, y2, ✓2) as in (52). To show this, define ⇠(x) for all x in
resemblance of (51) by the following equality
f(x, yˇ, ⇠(x))  ⇠(x)f✓(x, yˇ, ⇠(x)) =  (yˇ;x2, y2, ✓2). (59)
Substituting (52) into (51) reveals immediately that ⇠(x2) = ✓ˆ2. By (55) we can replace the right
hand side in (59) by  (yˇ;x1, y1, ✓1), and then the same argument establishes that ⇠(x1) = ✓ˆ1. Implicit
di↵erentiation yields ⇠0(x) = fx⇠(x)f✓✓  
fx✓
f✓✓
where we suppressed the argument (x, yˇ, ⇠(x)). Since we want
to show (56) or its equivalent (58), and x1 > x2 by assumption, we have to show that fy(x, yˇ, ⇠(x)) is
strictly increasing in x. It is strictly increasing in x if fxy + fy✓⇠0(x) > 0 where we again suppressed the
argument (x, yˇ, ⇠(x)), which is then equivalent to
f✓✓fxy   fy✓fx✓ + fy✓fx/⇠(x) < 0.
This formula coincides with the strict inequality (46) and therefore the strict inequality (48), i.e., the
strict version of inequality (11) which we assumed to hold. This condition establishes that output can
be strictly improved by pairing types positively assortatively, which proofs su ciency.
Part II: necessity. We need to show that (11) is necessary to have PAM under any distribution of
types. That is, if it is not true that (11) holds for all (x, y, l, r), then there will be a type distribution for
which PAM will not be an equilibrium. Assume that (11) fails at some (x0, y0, l00, r00). By continuity it
also fails at some (x0, y0, l0, r0) with l0 > 0 and r0 > 0 su ciently close to (x0, y0, l00, r00). Then it also fails at
(x0, y0, ✓0, 1) for ✓0 = l0/r0. By continuity, this means that FxyFlr < FylFxr for all (x, y, ✓, 1) 2 N , where
N is a small enough open neighborhood of (x0, y0, ✓0, 1). If we can restrict the equilibrium allocation to
lie in N , then by the analogy of the preceding section for negative assortative matching we know that
matching can only be negative assortative, and therefore (11) cannot fail if we want to obtain positive
assortative matching. Since we want to ensure positive assortative matching for all type distributions,
we can choose the support of x and y within this neighborhood. But since ✓ is endogenous, this requires
slightly more work. Assume that X = [x0, x0 + "] and Y = [y0, y0 + "], and uniform type distributions
with mass H"w(x
0+ ") = ✓0 and H"f (y
0+ ") = 1. For small enough "0, firms make nearly identical profits.
Since they can only match with nearly identical types, identical profits require them to have nearly
identical factor ratios ✓(x). These must be close to the average ratio in the population. Therefore, for
" small enough all matches lie in N , which rules out that matching can be positive assortative for all
type distributions if (11) fails.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consider the case of PAM – the case of NAM can be derived in a similar way. Di↵erentiating
market clearing condition (5) readily establishes the equation for µ0(x) in (14). The equation for w0(x)
follows from (8) since Fx = fx. Finally, totally di↵erentiating (7) with respect to x and substituting for
w0 and µ0 we obtain
fx✓ + fy✓H(x)/✓(x) + f✓✓✓0(x)  fx/✓(x) = 0 (60)
where we again suppressed the arguments (x, µ(x), ✓(x)) of the production function and its derivatives.
This defines ✓0(x). Using (2) we can replace fx✓(x, y, ✓) with Fxl(x, y, ✓, 1), and similarly for the other
derivatives. Moreover, in the Appendix (between (46) and (47)) we review that Fx = ✓Fxl + Fxr and
Flr =  ✓Fll when evaluated at (x, y, ✓, 1). Substitution then yields the condition for ✓0(x) in (14).
A.7 The Non-Homogeneous Production Technology
Let output of the firm be F (x, y, l, r), and the firm of type y chooses the worker type and the labor
intensity l. As before, let the capital intensity r be given, but we no longer require constant returns to
scale in the quantity dimensions. Then the problem of a firm that chooses exactly one type x is
max
x˜,l˜
F (x˜, y, l˜, r)  l˜w(x˜)  rv(y). (61)
The first order conditions for optimality are
Fx(x, µ(x), l, r)  lw0(x) = 0 (62)
Fl(x, µ(x), l, r)  w(x) = 0 (63)
where µ(x) and l are the equilibrium values. The second order condition of this problem requires the
Hessian H to be negative definite:
H =
✓
Fxx   lw00 Fxl   w0
Fxl   w0 Fll
◆
(64)
which requires that all the eigenvalues are negative or equivalently, Fxx   lw00 < 0 (which follows from
concavity in all the arguments (x, y, l, r)), and     Fxx   lw00 Fxl   w0Fxl   w0 Fll
     > 0. (65)
After di↵erentiating the two FOCs along the equilibrium allocation to substitute for Fxx lw00 =  Fxyµ0
and Fxl   w0 =  Fylµ0 and also using the first FOC to rewrite w0 = Fx/l we get      Fxyµ0  Fylµ0Fxl   w0 Fll
     > 0 (66)
or  FxyFllµ0 + (Fxl   Fx/l)Fylµ0 > 0 and thus PAM requires (knowing that Fll < 0)
Fxy >
(Fx/l   Fxl)Fyl
|Fll| . (67)
Observe that this condition is similar to the one we obtained for the homogeneous case, only that now
the condition depends on the marginal product Fx and the concavity of F in l, Fll.32 Finally, it is
easy to show that the firm finds it strictly optimal to indeed concentrate all its resources on one worker
type if F has increasing returns to scale in l and r. With decreasing returns to scale this is not true,
and one has to additionally impose the restriction that firms can only hire one worker type to use our
methodology.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Let v⇤(x, y, s, r) maximize F (x, y, rvm(s/vr), r)   rvc. Also, define V ⇤(x, y, s, r) as the maxi-
mizer of F (x, y, V m(s/V ), r)   V c with respect to V . Given our assumptions on the production and
matching function, it is easy to show that V ⇤ is unique and determined by the appropriate first or-
der condition, which in turn implies that it is di↵erentiable by the implicit function theorem. Clearly
V ⇤(x, y, s, r) = rv⇤(x, y, s, r) and we can writeG(x, y, s, r) = F (x, y, V ⇤(x, y, s, r)m(s/V ⇤(x, y, s, r)), r) 
V ⇤(x, y, s, r)c. The sorting condition on G has to hold for all (x, y, s, r). Note that any quantity of labor
l = V ⇤(x, y, s, r)m(s/V ⇤(x, y, s, r)) can be sustained by an appropriate choice of (x, y, s, r) as long as
fl(x, y, l) > c, which obtains directly from the first order condition for v⇤. So conditions on F are
restricted to this domain.
For G, we obtain the first order conditions
Gy = Fy(x, y, V
⇤(x, y, s, r)m(s/V ⇤(x, y, s, r)), r) (68)
Gr = Fr(x, y, V
⇤(x, y, s, r)m(s/V ⇤(x, y, s, r)), r) (69)
where we drop arguments from the equation whenever there is no possibility of confusion. The argu-
ments related to @V ⇤/@y and @V ⇤/@r do not appear because of the envelop condition. Cross-partial
derivatives are
32The condition for sorting here depends on Fxl which is not the case in condition (11). Of course, there are transfor-
mations of (11) that include di↵erent derivatives (e.g. Fxl), obviously with a less concise and intuitive interpretation.
Gxy = Fxy + Fyl
@(V ⇤m(s/V ⇤))
@V ⇤
@V ⇤
@x
(70)
Gsr = Flr

@(V ⇤m(s/V ⇤))
@s
+
@(V ⇤m(s/V ⇤))
@V ⇤
@V ⇤
@s
 
(71)
Gys = Fyl

@(V ⇤m(s/V ⇤))
@s
+
@(V ⇤m(s/V ⇤))
@V ⇤
@V ⇤
@s
 
(72)
Gxr = Fxr + Frl
@(V ⇤m(s/V ⇤))
@V ⇤
@V ⇤
@x
. (73)
Now the sorting condition GxyGsr   GysGxr is equivalent to the condition on output FxyFrl   FylFxr.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. We can rewrite the firms’ original maximization problem (28) as max✓(x),Ry(x)
R
[F (x, y, ✓(x), 1) 
C(✓(x), x)]dRy(x) where Ry(x) integrates to unity, with C(l, x) = minv,q[cv + vqw(x)] s.t. l = vm(q).
To hire a given number l of workers of type x, the firm has two choice variables: its queue length
or its number of vacancies. The firm chooses them optimally to minimize the costs of achieving l
hires, and C(l, x) represents the minimum cost. Writing the elasticity of the matching probability as
⌘(q) := qm0(q)/m(q) and by denoting the queue length that solves the minimization problem by q(x),
we obtain
w(x)q(x) =
⌘(q(x))
1  ⌘(q(x))c. (74)
For commonly used matching functions for which the elasticity is constant, this immediately implies that
q(x) is decreasing since w(x) is increasing, and strictly so if the workers are actually hired (otherwise
firms could attract better workers at lower costs, violating optimality). In general, the term ⌘(q)/[q(1 
⌘(q))] = m0(q)/[m(q)   qm0(q)] is decreasing in q, since the numerator is strictly decreasing and the
denominator is strictly increasing in q. Implicit di↵erentiation of (74) implies that q(x) is decreasing.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Consider PAM (likewise for NAM). The vacancy filling probability m(q) is decreasing in x, and
under PAM also in y. The vacancy rate (v/l = 1/m(q)) is then increasing. However, from Proposition
2, firm size ambiguous is in y. In particular, size is increasing if H(x)Gyl   Gxr and decreasing if the
inequality is reversed.
A.11 E ciency Units of Labor
A special case of our framework is the setting with e ciency units of labor, where firm y hires types
x1, .., xn at quantities l1, .., ln produces output F˜ (y,
Pn
i=1 xili) that is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in the second argument with appropriate Inada conditions. We claim that the same level of
output is replicated in our setting when F (x, y, l, r) = rF˜ (y, xl/r). This is trivially true when there is
only one worker type, as all resources are concentrated on this type. Now consider several worker types
x1, .., xn at quantities l1, .., ln. The firm allocates its unit amount of resources optimally between them,
i.e., solves
max
r1,...,rn2[0,1]n
nX
i=1
F (xi, y, li,ri) s.t.
nX
i=1
ri = 1 (75)
, max
r1,...,rn2[0,1]n
nX
i=1
riF˜ (y, xili/ri) s.t.
nX
i=1
ri = 1. (76)
Writing r1 = 1 
P
i>1 ri and taking first order conditions to the problem are for all i = 2, ..., n yields
F˜
✓
y,
x1l1
r1
◆
  x1l1
r1
F˜
✓
y,
x1l1
r1
◆
  F˜ 0
✓
y,
xili
ri
◆
+
xili
ri
F˜ 0
✓
y,
xili
ri
◆
= 0. (77)
An obvious (and also unique) solution to this is to set r⇤i such that factor intensities are equalized, i.e.,
x1l1
r⇤1
= xilir⇤i
. That is, r⇤i =
xiliPn
j=1 xj lj
. Then the total output that the firm achieves is
nX
i=1
F (xi, y, li,r
⇤
i ) =
nX
i=1
r⇤i F˜ (y, xili/r
⇤
i ) (78)
=
nX
i=1
xiliPn
j=1 xjlj
F˜ (y,
nX
j=1
xjlj) (79)
= F˜ (y,
nX
j=1
xjlj), (80)
which was to be proven.
A.12 Generalized E ciency Units of Labor
Consider firm y that hires di↵erent worker types x1, x2, ..., xn at quantities l1, l2, ..., ln. Generalized e -
ciency units are captured by a production function f˜(x¯, y, L) which takes as input the average type x¯ =P
lixi/
P
li and the sum of labor cL =
P
li. In contrast, in our setting there is a production function
f(x, y, l) if there is only one worker type, but otherwise output is given by maxr1,r2,...,rn
P
F (xi, y, li, ri)
with
P
ri = 1 and F (xi, y, li, ri) := rif(xi, y, li/ri). Clearly, for our production function to sat-
isfy the generalized e ciency unit formulation, it must do so even if only one worker type x1 is
present. So f(x, y, l) = f˜(x, y, l). This defines f completely, and therefore F is also completely defined.
When f˜ is strictly convex in its first argument, our production function does not capture its pro-
duction under multiple types. In fact, our production function always produces more: f˜(x¯, y, L) Pn
i=1
liPn
j=1 lj
f˜(xi, y,
Pn
j=1 lj)  maxr1,r2,...,rn
P
rif˜(xi, y, li/ri) with
P
ri = 1. The first inequality fol-
lows from convexity, and the second would be fulfilled with equality if ri =
liPn
j=1 lj
, but in general will
be strict because the maximum is higher. But note that maxr1,r2,...,rn
P
rif˜(xi, y, li/ri) with
P
ri = 1
is the output that a firm in our setup would make (since F (xi, y, li, ri) = rif˜(xi, y, li/ri)). Under our
production functions the welfare theorems apply, so output must be maximized. If our sorting condition
applies, the firm objective is maximized when firms do not hire multiple workers in our setting. With
generalized e ciency units the same output can be produced if only one type is hired, but strictly less
if multiple types are hired by one firm, so also in that case, firms do not want to mix multiple types
and our sorting condition remains su cient. The condition also remains necessary since its violation
leads to breakdown of PAM but not to break-down of pure matching, which can still be replicated even
under generalized e ciency units.
A.13 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. To establish PAM between xi and y, we can fix all other variables and focus on this di-
mension. Let fˆ i(xi, y, li) = g(f i(xi, y, li), f i(x i, l i, y)) Then the associated Fˆ i is by (2) defined as
Fˆ i(xi, y, li, ri) = rifˆ i(xi, y, li/ri) or equivalently Fˆ i(x, y, l, r) = rig(f i(xi, y, li/ri), f i(x i, l i, y)) =
rig(F i(xi, y, li, ri)/ri, f i(x i, l i, y)). Successively doing this for all i leads to output function
F = (⇧i=1,...,nri) g(F
1(x1, y, l1, r1)/r1, ..., F
n(xn, y, ln, rn)/rn). (81)
For there to be PAM in xi, y, we require
FxiyFliri   FyliFxiri (82)
where
Fxi = (⇧j=1,...,n,j 6=irj)giF
i
xi (83)
Fli = giF
i
li (84)
Fxiy = giF
i
xiy + F
i
xi
24giiF iy
ri
+
X
j 6=i
gij
dF j
dy
35 (85)
Fliri = giF
i
liri + giiF
i
l
"
 F
i
r2i
+
F iri
ri
#
(86)
Fyli = giF
i
yli + F
i
l
24giiF iy
ri
+
X
j 6=i
gij
dF j
dy
35 (87)
Fxiri = giF
i
xiri + giiF
i
xi
"
 F
i
r2i
+
F iri
ri
#
(88)
and gi denotes the partial derivative of g with respect to its i0th argument. Then we can write the
condition for PAM in xi, y as:24giF ixiy + F ixi
24giiF iy
ri
+
X
j 6=i
gij
dF j
dy
3535"giF iliri + giiF il
"
 F
i
r2i
+
F iri
ri
##
(89)
 
24giF iyli + F il
24hiiF iy
ri
+
X
j 6=i
gij
dF j
dy
3535"giF ixiri + giiF ixi
"
 F
i
r2i
+
F iri
ri
##
(90)
or
(gi)
2
⇥
F ixiyF
i
liri   F iyliF ixiri
⇤
+ gigii
"
 F
i
r2i
+
F iri
ri
# ⇥
F ixiyF
i
l   F iyliF ixi
⇤
(91)
+gi
24giiF iy
ri
+
X
j 6=i
gij
dF j
dy
35 ⇥F iliriF ixi   F ixiriF il ⇤   0. (92)
This condition has to hold along the equilibrium path, otherwise the second-order condition for opti-
mality is violated. If the condition holds everywhere, we have proven earlier that this is su cient for
optimality for the given subunit.
A.14 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider a subunit i. If dF j/dy   0 for all j 6= i, then the conditions on g together with (23)
and (25) insure that (22) holds for all (x, l, r, y). This is easiest seen by noticing that CRTS implies
that F i = liF il + riF
i
r so that F
i
l
li
ri
= F i/ri   F iri , which can be substituted into (25). (22) then follows
immediately. Since we can do this for all subunits i, this implies PAM everywhere as long as each
subunits believes that the other subunits expand output with productivity.
So we simply must check that under PAM it is indeed optimal for each i to increase output with
productivity. Note that output changes according to
dF i/dy = F ix⌫
0
i + F
i
y + F
i
l l
0
i⌫
0 (93)
  F ix⌫ 0i + F iy + F il
HF iyl   F ixr
F ilr
⌫ 0, (94)
where the last step follows because size l0i(x) in equilibrium can be determined in similar ways as ✓ı´0(x)
in condition (60). The only di↵erence is that when “totally di↵erentiating (7)” additional terms arise
that have to do with dF j/dy in the other subunits. Under the beliefs that these are increasing, this
leads to additional forces that also point towards larger firms, leading to an even larger response than
in the basic model. Clearly (24) ensures that dF i/dy   0 no matter what the ratio of types H.
A.15 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Without loss, we drop the superscript i. B being Cobb-Douglas can then be interpreted as
CES with elasticity of substitution "B = 1. Then
BBlr
BlBr
=
1
"B
= 1. (95)
Therefore F iliriF
i
xi   F ixiriF il = ABlrAxB  AxBrABl = AAx(BlrB  BrBl) = 0, and the third term in
the main condition (22) becomes zero. Then the main condition (22) becomes:
(gi)
2 [AxyABBlr  AxAyBlBr]  gigii ABr2BBl [AxyA AxAy] > 0. (96)
The term AxyABBlr AxAyBlBr > 0 is implied by (26). In the second term, the expression in brackets
AxyA   AxAy > 0 follows from (26) and (95). With gii < 0, the second term is positive, a su cient
condition for the whole expression (96) to be positive.
Appendix B Misallocation Debate
This section supplies additional material for the discussion on misallocation in Section 4. Our illustration
is based on Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014), who use the following production function f˜(x, y, l, k) =
a(⌘(xk)⇢ + (1   ⌘)(yl)⇢)  ⇢ with x = 1 and parameters ⌘, ⇢,   and productivity a = Apa, where A is
aggregate productivity, pa is the output price, and  is a scalar that can distinguish developing and
developed countries. They determine the rental rate R of generic capital within a larger multi-sector
model. Instead, we take the rental rate as given for our illustration that only focusses on the agricultural
sector. We use their values for their case with di↵erent aggregate factors but without distortions, as
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters
Parameter US Baseline (Rich) Less A (Poor) Source
TFP (A) 1.0 0.3987 Normalization
Price of agricultural good (pa) 0.3159 0.5209 Calibration
Rental price of Capital (R) 0.13099 0.3958 Equilibrium
Average and per capita (L/N) 169.249 19.595 Data
 1.0 1.0 Normalization
⇢ 1/4 1/4 Calibration
⌘ 0.89 0.89 Calibration
Mean farmer skill (µy) -1.8316 -1.8316 Calibration
Std farmer skill ( y) 4.6553 4.6553 Calibration
The distribution of farmer skill is assumed to be a lognormal with the parameters specified above.
Average land per capita plays a role as a scaling factor for the distributions of x and y. Our only
adjustment is to round the elasticity of substitution to ⇢ = 0.25 from their original value of 0.24, which
allows us to use third degree polynomials to calculate the optimal capital. Figure 5 shows that this does
not matter much for our ability to replicate their firm size distribution in developed and developing
countries within our matching setup with nearly identical workers (x ⇡ 1).
Figure 5: Replication of the firm size distribution in Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) with our
computational algorithm with negligible spread in x and ⇢ = .25.
Defining F˜ (x, y, l, r, k) = rf˜(x, y, l/r, k) and F (x, y, l, r) = maxk F˜ (x, y, l, r, k)   Rkr, we can ei-
ther use (11) directly to see whether sorting is PAM; alternatively we can use the envelope condition
developed in Extension II below in this Appendix and PAM arises if
{FxyFlrFkk   FxyFlkFrk   FxkFykFlr}  {FxrFylFkk   FxrFykFlk   FxkFylFrk} > 0 (97)
,
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so that it holds for the chosen parameters in both the rich and the poor country as long as x, y, l, r, k
are positive. We find the equilibrium by first finding the optimal generic capital level given x, y, l, r and
for computational ease we approximate it by a high-order polynomial. Substituting this out to obtain
F (x, y, l, r), we can use the first two equations in (14) as a di↵erential equation system in µ(x) and
✓(x). We use truncated distributions on both sides, and know that the top agents are matched. The
other end-point condition is that the lowest types are matched if all agents can obtain positive payo↵s,
otherwise the cuto↵ type at the side that is not fully matched makes zero payo↵s. We use a shooting
algorithm to hit the end-point conditions along the equilibrium path.
When we spread the type distribution for land, we use a truncated lognormal distribution with
µx = 1 and  x = 0.2. That is, the mean of land quality is still 1. We increase the spread by increasing
the distance between the truncation points. The actual algorithm is solved on a grid. Supplementary
material with construction and code are available.
Appendix C Extensions
C.1 Extension I. Monopolistic Competition
In the previous sections, we analyzed the case where the firm’s output is converted one-for-one into
agents’ utility. Therefore, there are no consequences of output on its price, which is normalized to one.
An often used assumption in the industrial organization and the trade literature concerns consumer
preferences pioneered by Dixit and Stiglitz, which are CES with elasticity of substitution ⇢ 2 (0, 1)
among the goods produced by di↵erent firms. For these preferences it is well-known that a firm that
produces output f˜ achieves sales revenues  f˜⇢, where   is an equilibrium outcome that is viewed as
constant from the perspective of the individual firm.33 The di culty in this setup is that, despite the
fact that output is constant returns to scale in employment and firm resources, the revenue of the firm
has decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, we cannot directly apply (11). But if there is assortative
matching the firm employs only one worker type, in which case revenues are f(x, y, l) =  f˜(x, y, l)⇢, and
we can apply (46) directly. If f˜(x, y, l) is multiplicatively separable and linear in l so that we can write
f˜(x, y, l) = g(x, y)l, then our sorting condition reduces to the requirement of log-supermodularity of g,
which is a known condition in the trade literature. Our condition also implies insights into the non-
separable and non-linear case. Rearranging and using F˜ (x, y, l, r) = rf˜(x, y, l/r) we get the condition
33The underlying form for the utility function is U = x1 µ0
 R
c(y)⇢dy
 µ/⇢
, where x0 is a numeraire good and c(y) is the
amount of consumption of the good of producer y. Then one obtains   = (µY )1 ⇢P ⇢ where Y is the aggregate income,
py denotes the price achieved by firm y through its equilibrium quantity, and P =
⇣R
p⇢/(1 ⇢)y
⌘⇢/(1 ⇢)
represents the
aggregate price index.
for positive assortative matching"
⇢F˜xy + (1  ⇢)(F˜ )@
2 ln F˜
@x@y
#"
⇢F˜lr   (1  ⇢)lF˜ @
2 ln F˜
@l2
#
(99)
 
"
⇢F˜yl + (1  ⇢)F˜ @
2 ln F˜
@y@l
#"
⇢F˜xr + (1  ⇢)
 
lF˜xl   lF˜ @
2 ln F˜
@x@r
!#
. (100)
Several points are note-worthy. First, the condition is independent of  , and therefore can be checked
before this term is computed as an outcome of the market interaction. Furthermore, for elastic pref-
erences (  ! 1) the condition reduces to our original condition (11). Otherwise, log-supermodularity
also appears in the condition.
C.2 Extension II. Optimal transportation
Assume it costs  r · c(x, y) to move r units of waste from production site x into destination storage
y, and if one attempts to move more units r into any given amount l of storage then there is some
probability of damage d(r/l) that each unit that is stored gets destroyed. This leads to function
F (x, y, l, r) =  rc(x, y)  ↵rd(r/l), where ↵ represents the lost revenue because of destruction. Unlike
in the standard Monge-Kantorovich transportation problem, storage sites do not have a fixed capacity
(except if d(r/l) is zero when r/l is below unity and a very large number if it is above). Rather, more
or less can be stored in a given location, but at increasing costs.
C.3 Extension III. Endogenous type distributions, technology choice, team-work
One way to endogenize the type distribution is to assume that there is free entry of firms (free entry
of resources in the model), but entry with type y costs c(y). If output increases in y, i.e., F2 > 0, then
it is crucial for a meaningful entry decision that c(y) is strictly increasing. If c is strictly increasing
and di↵erentiable, and our sorting condition is satisfied everywhere, it is not di cult to construct an
equilibrium where profits equal the entry cost c(y) for all active firms. In fact, this formulation is easier
to construct: we know that the highest types match, so that µ (x¯) = y¯. The problem is usually how to
determine at which ratio they match, i.e., to find ✓(x¯). But here it is given simply by the requirement
that the profits of the highest firm equal the entry costs. Substituting the first order condition (7) into
the objective function yields profit f(x¯, µ(x¯), ✓(x¯)) ✓(x¯)f✓(x¯, µ(x¯), ✓(x¯)), which have to equal c(µ (x¯)).
This can be then used together with the first order conditions and the di↵erential equations in (14) to
construct the type distribution after entry at all lower types.
More complicated is the analysis when one considers a common pool of workers, some of whom
choose to be managers while others choose to remain workers. This is then a teamwork problem, where
one team becomes the y0s and the other the x0s. While interesting, we leave this analysis for further
work.
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